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INTRODUCrION

In Andre Moenssens' recent article Handwriting Identification
Evidence in the Post-Daubert World,' certain articles and other activities
of the present authors were a primary focus of criticism. Much of
that criticism was factually inaccurate and, we believe, unjustifiably
intemperate. As such, it requires a response. However, it is important to separate the ad hominem aspects of Professor Moenssens' piece
from the ideas expressed there and to evaluate the latter on their
merits. In an attempt to maintain such separation to the extent productively possible, we have structured this article as follows: Part I
will be confined to the "merits" critique just referred to. When it is
necessary to deal with Professor Moenssens' views about us in Part I,
we have attempted to be as brief and moderate as fairness both to
Professor Moenssens and ourselves will allow. In Part II, we have responded in detail to Professor Moenssens' charges against us, and
have given our evaluation of his analysis and the care with which he
has made those charges.
PART I
A.

Moenssens' main theses and criticisms

We believe the main outlines of Professor Moenssens' position
may be fairly summarized as follows:
" Many people may be called to the witness stand by lawyers as
asserted experts to offer opinions concerning the genuineness of a signature or the authorship of some questioned writing.'
* Many of those who are willing to testify have no such expertise.4

66 UMKC L. REV. 251 (1998) [hereinafter Moenssens, Post-Daubert World].
Specifically, D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux, & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for RationalKnowledge: The Lessons of HandwritingIdentification "Expertise",137 U. PA. L. REv. 731 (1989) [hereinafter Risinger et al., Exorcism]
(adopting Moenssens' usage) and D. Michael Risinger & MichaelJ. Saks, Science and
Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets HandwritingIdentification Expertise, 82 IOwA L.
REV. 21 (1996) [hereinafter, Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience]. Although Professor Denbeaux was not a co-author of Science and Nonscience, he has read it and fully
agrees with and adopts its positions. We have therefore generally used the term "we"
in referring to positions taken in both articles in order to avoid unnecessarily awkward qualifications of diction.
3 See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 252-53.
4 See id. at 259.
2
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" However, within the universe of people willing to so testify,
there is an identifiable subset who are sufficiently skilled and
dependable that there ought to be no question of their qualification to testify. 5
" That subset consists of persons who have been trained in
"Osbornian"6 principles of handwriting identification and
have had sufficient clinical experience in applying those principles in practice.
" It was wrong of Saks, Denbeaux, and Risinger in their 1989
University of Pennsylvania Law Review article entitled Exorcism of
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of
Handwriting Identiication "Expertise" (Exorcism)7 not to distinguish explicitly this subset and not to recognize that their critiques, to the extent they had any validity at all, did not apply
to this subset.
" In addition, if there were ever any tenable skepticism concerning properly trained Osbornian practitioners, it has been
totally eliminated by the study reported by Kam et al.8 in
1997.9
" Indeed,
these practitioners are worthy of the name
"scientist,"" and it was wrong of the Supreme Court in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow PharmaceuticalsInc." to set up a false dichotomy
between "science" and non-scientific expertise, based on a
Newtonian or Popperian view of "science,"
which was narrow
2
and outmoded when Daubertinvoked it.1
" While it is true that handwriting identification
and many
other forensic science disciplines, as well as many clinical disciplines outside of forensic science, may not be able to meet
the kind of reliability criteria set out in Daubert, there is another model for establishing reliability of such a clinical sci5 See id. at 257-58, 310-29.
6

That is, methods pioneered by Albert Osborn in the first edition of his book.

See generally ALBERT S. OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (1910). For an overview of
the Osbornian approach see Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 67-74.
7 Risinger et al., Exorcism,
supra note 2.
8 Moshe Kam, Gabriel Fielding & Robert Conn, Writer Identication
by Professional
Document Examiners, 42 J. FORENSIC Sci. 778 (1997) [hereinafter Kam II], to distinguish it from the earlier study, Moshe Kam, Joseph Welstein, & Robert Conn, Proficiency of Professional Document Examiners in Writer Identification, 39 J. FORENSIC Sc. 5
(1994), [hereinafter Kam I].
9 See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 311-12.
10 See, e.g., id.at 311-12.
12

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 274-85.
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ence which
is much more appropriate to its situation and re3
alities.
Professor Moenssens then goes on to describe his new proposed
model in detail. 4 We will examine the Moenssens model later, but
fundamentally it is a process check15 that depends upon the existence
of what is essentially a guild.
Professor Moenssens seems to have a number of goals in his article: (1) to alert the reader to doctrinal differences and differences
in training and experience among people called as handwriting experts in American courts; (2) to establish the superiority of one doctrine, one method of training, and one group; (3) to recapture the
label of "science," with its attendant rhetorical power, for handwriting identification, at least when undertaken by the right group; and
(4) to guard against any residual risk that such disciplines might be
found too unreliable to be the subject of testimony, first by trashing
the credibility of critics by any available means and, second, by proposing a standard of "reliability" tailored both to insure admissibility
and to establish his favored group as the monopoly guild. Finally,
the underlying hope that appears to be reflected in the Moenssens
article is that, if the rest of these goals are accomplished, the practical
effect will be to ensure that fact finders are not provided with any
skeptical interpretation of either the methodology or the available
validity data (or lack thereof) from any person not certified by the
guild.
It is difficult to know how many people currently exist who give
or have given expert testimony on handwriting identification issues,
whether only once or hundreds of times. Magnitude guesstimates
have been given ranging from 1200 to around 5500. It is undoubtSee id. at 294-97.
See id. at 291-94.
15 By process check, we mean any legal device that
claims or hopes to impose
substantive limits on something indirectly as a byproduct of requiring certain procedures. Or, as Moenssens himself says, "The issue ought not to be whether opinions
by practitioners in a particular forensic science profession can be quantified statistically in terms of error rates, but whether the opinion of a practitioner was arrived at
by following a 'scientific method' of comparison." Id. at 320; see also infra notes 11417 and accompanying text.
16 The lower estimate comes from the testimony of Robert
Muehlberger in the
Daubert hearing in United States v. Martin. See Transcript of Proceedings at 137,
United States v. Martin, No. 1:96-CR-287-JEC (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 1997) (unreported
copy on file with authors) [hereinafter Martin Transcript].
At that time
Muehlberger was chairman of the Questioned Documents section of the American
Academy of Forensic Science (AAFS) and vice president of the American Society of
Questioned Document Examiners (ASQDE). See id. at 133. The higher estimate
comes from Moenssens himself, when he says, in Post-Daubert World, "[T]he total
13

14
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edly true that there is a great variety of theory, methodology, training, and experience among people who are willing (and are permitted) to testify to handwriting identification issues as experts. It is also
true that such experts can profitably be divided into two groups:
"orthodox Osbornians" (practitioners trained in the methods pioneered and distilled by Albert S. Osborn in 1910)," 7 and the more
numerous graphologically influenced practitioners (who may or may
not use some or all Osbornian methods, but who claim that graphological study,'8 whether effective in divining personality or not,
improves one's ability to identify handwriting) .'9
Beyond these purely descriptive details, however, things that are
"undoubtedly true" become scarcer. In the Exorcism article, we approached the question globally by asking what data then existed to
indicate that handwriting experts in general, or that any of them in
particular, could do some or all of the things they claim to be able to
do and are willing to testify to. It was not that we were not aware of
potential subgroupings, or the possibility of variations among subgroups. It was simply that until the extant data were identified globally, such subgroup questions could not be usefully addressed. We
then looked for such data and found that either a tiny amount existed, or none, depending on how one regards the set of proficiency
number of persons deemed competent to act as questioned document examiners by
the two major professional societies is less than 500" and that the graphologists who
testify as to handwriting identification "possibly outnumber them more than 10 to
1." Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 265 n.43.
17
See generally OSBORN, supra note 6. The term "orthodox Osbornian" or simply
"Osbornian" was originally coined in Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, and then
adopted by Moenssens. See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 257.
Graphology is generally understood to be the attempt to determine personality traits from examination of handwriting. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIG
TIONARY 501 (1977).
19 Curiously, the orthodox Osbornians cannot agree
among themselves about
how many people are truly qualified as handwriting identification experts, even in
the face of the certification program of the American Board of Forensic Document
Examination (ABFDE) (the credentialing arm sponsored jointly by the ASQDE and
the AAFS Document Section and the Canadian Society of Forensic Science). See
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 257 n.15. This is because many government agencies, most notably the FBI, do not require that their document examiners obtain certification beyond in-house training, and the ASQDE is unwilling to
take the position that certification is a sine qua non of competence, especially since
all the older members of the ASQDE were grandfathered into certification without
testing when the ABFDE was established in 1977. Estimates of competent Osbornian
Questioned Document Examiners (QDEs) range from 180 (according to FBI document section chief Ronald Furgerson, reported in D. FISHER, HARD EVIDENCE, 196
(1995)), to "not more than 300-500," (Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1,
at 270), to "about 500." (Muehlberger testimony, Martin transcript at 138, supra note
16).
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test results we have collectively referred to as the Forensic Sciences
Foundation (FSF) studies. 0
Moenssens makes a number of explicit substantive criticisms of
our approach repeatedly and at length: (1) that our search for data
was not thorough,' (2) that we erred in believing that quantified data
on handwriting identification ought to exist, 22 and (3) that we erred
in concentrating on quantified data and excluding anecdotal case
studies as "data. '22 Finally, Moenssens claims that we misinterpreted
or misused the data we did find,4 which he asserts are not in fact
relevant data, but are essentially meaningless. We now must turn to
these substantive criticisms.
1.

The claim that our search for data was not thorough

Professor Moenssens' arguments concerning the sloppiness of
our search for data are expansions on similar charges made by the
Galbraiths2 5 between 1989 and 1995, which we dealt with in our 1997
article Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting
Identification Expertise (Science and Nonscience)2 6 (a fact Moenssens fails
to note). Moenssens' contribution to the debate consists mainly of
condemnatory adjectives, and the addition of Dutch to the list of foreign languages in which we failed to search for publications. Moenssens' whole point strikes us as a bit disingenuous, since the published
20 In 1975, under a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
the Forensic Sciences Foundation (FSF) set out to create proficiency tests for forensic expert specialties, among them handwriting identification. The results of the
1975 pilot test were later reported in JOSEPH L. PETERSON, ELLEN L. FABRICANT, &
KENNETH S. FIELD, CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING RESEARCH PROGRAM, FINAL
REPORT (1978).
A permanent yearly testing program was begun in 1978 and a

handwriting component was added in 1984. See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note
2, at 740. These tests were "operated and maintained by Collaborative Testing Services, Inc." (a contract consultant in test design) "with assistance provided by the Forensic Sciences Foundation," and technical supervision "by the Proficiency Advisory
Committee (PAC), a committee of the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors." CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM, QUESTIONED DOcUMENTS
ANALYSIS, REPORT No. 89-5. These tests have come to be referred to collectively as
the "FSF studies."
21 See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1,
at 300-02.
See, e.g., id. at 306.
23
See id. at 301-02.
24 See, e.g., id. at 302 n.228.
25 Oliver Galbraith III, Craig S. Galbraith, & Nanette G. Galbraith,
The Principle of
the "Drunkard'sSearch" as a Proxy for Scientific Analysis: The Misuse of Handwriting Test
Data in a Law Review Article, 1 INT'LJ. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINERS 7 (1995). Earlier versions of this article were circulated in photocopied form at various document
examiner meetings from 1989 to its formal publication in 1995.
26 See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note
2, at 58.

1998]

REPLY TO MOENSSENS

description of our literature search in Exorcism explicitly points out
that we searched the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,
which, we further explicitly noted, contains abstracts of significant articles published throughout the world." Be that as it may, the important thing is that neither the Galbraiths nor Moenssens, nor anyone
else, has in ten years of highly motivated looking, found a single
study generating data on the issue of handwriting identification validity that existed at the time of Exorcism's publication and was not dealt
with in that article. 8 So either we were very lucky, or our search
strategy was better than Moenssens is willing to credit.2
2.

The claim that we erred in expecting to find quantified
validity data

Professor Moenssens' position on quantified validity data is startling. He opposes "a drastic rule limiting expert opinion evidence
only to testimony that can be shown to be reliable by reference to
27
28

See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 784.
That no such studies exist has been attested to by others who have been moti-

vated to look, found nothing, and said so: "[T]here certainly has been a shortage of
studies comparing handwriting identification expertise with non-expertise ......
Galbraith et al., supra note 25, at 7 n.7. There is an "admittedly sparse history of
carefully controlled empirical studies." Id. at 7.
If there is a conclusion that can be drawn from the comprehensive literature search performed by Risinger et al .... it is that good tests for
determining the existence or nonexistence of handwriting expertise
need to be devised and that there is a lamentable lack of empirical
evidence about the subject in the forensic literature.
Kam I, supra note 8, at 7.
The issue of QDE ability is "characterized by acute lack of empirical evidence
on the proficiency of document examiners," and that as a result of this deficiency "it
is widely agreed that testing of professional document examiners and acquiring data
on their abilities.., are necessary." Kam II, supra note 8, at 778.
29 After all the sound and fury about the terrible literature
search, Moenssens
himself admits we were right:
The Exorcism authors, in their self-directed, although partial and highly
selective, literature study of handwriting identification had neglected to
study the - of the worthy and unworthy handwriting analysts [sic]. They
had stumbled upon some truly valid points that were made with professorial eloquence: (1) there was indeed a dearth of published empirical
information relating to the proficiency of document examiners, as they
had asserted ....
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 300 (footnotes omitted). Elsewhere,
Moenssens has been less grudging concerning the absence of empirical evidence
pointed out by the Exorcism article: "On that the critics are absolutely correct." Andre Moenssens, Address to the AAFS, (Feb. 17-22, 1997) (speaking to an audience of
QDEs, taken from Saks's contemporaneous notes). "Document examiners have not
done the kind of empirical research that could have and should have been done."
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calculated error rates and statistics. 0 0 Further, he suggests that examination of the validity of practice in nearly any clinical field in ways
that yield such data is well nigh impossible,' and therefore the assumption that such data ought to exist and be preferred to anecdotal
declarations of self-belief is wrongheaded.3 This position ignores the
role of validity research in virtually every general field that is embedded in any enterprise that can credibly claim the mantle of science in
any sense. As Moenssens points out, many practitioners undertaking
clinical tasks in areas usually regarded as "scientific," such as surgery
or psychology, may not, in much of what they do, be practicing something comfortably called "science. 3 However, as he fails to point
out, in virtually any such field practitioners are supported within the
general enterprise by a research arm that not only expands knowledge that might prove useful in the clinical setting (such as the development of a new drug), but also provides research on the validity
and effectiveness of the techniques of practice. Moreover, the practitioners cooperate with the researchers to enable the research to be
conducted. For instance, regular research is done on the effectiveness of various surgical techniques. As a result of this research, many
such techniques have been shown to do more harm than good and
have been abandoned 4 There is no reason why similar research
could not be done on handwriting identification, dowsing, or virtu-

30 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supranote 1, at 279.
31 Moenssens refers to "opinion testimony based on techniques that have not
been or cannot be subjected to rigorous scientific methodology and validated by statistical information on error rates ..." and also to "established forensic sciences that
have not and cannot be measured and validated by mathematical and statistical models[.]" Id. at 282 (emphasis added). He further states that handwriting experts engage in judgments "that defy quantification and measurement." Id. at 253 (emphasis
added). Finally, and most startlingly, he says that often opinion evidence based on
comparison of two items cannot qualify "as 'scientific knowledge,' since many examinations are of unique and singular events, the accuracy of which cannot be readily
cataloguedas right-or-wrong up-or-down, or measured and quantified statistically." Id. at 301
(emphasis added). By this he seems to have turned the issue of identification into
Schr6dinger's cat. But we are hardly dealing with quantum phenomena. First, if the
"events" were truly "unique and singular" they could not be compared to determine
identity of source, since they would share no similarity, and second, if anything demands to be treated as a clear case of "right or wrong" it would seem to be a conclusion concerning identity of source.
32 See id. at 305.
33 See id. at 277-78.
34 One measure of a field's scientific vigor is its capacity to
discover its errors and
replace them with newer and better knowledge and techniques. See generally COSTS,
RISKS, AND BENEFITS OF SURGERY (John P. Bunker, Benjamin A. Barnes, & Frederick
Mosteller eds., 1977) (reviewing research findings on a variety of surgical techniques, finding that many popular surgeries actually were ineffective or harmful).
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ally any area of claimed clinical skill or expertise. 5 Indeed, Moenssens himself celebrates one person attempting such research, Dr.
Moshe Kam. 6 In any area asserting the right to the label "science,"
35 Indeed, Moenssens is clearly aware of this when he wants to be. See
his mar-

shaling of the substantial empirical research showing the invalidity of the personality
trait prediction aspects of graphology in Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 261
n.31. The number and range of subjective human decision-making tasks of the sort
that Moenssens seems to argue cannot be studied empirically, yet which have in fact
been studied empirically, is great and diverse. For further examples, see generally
Robert D. Hoge & Theodore Coladarci, Teacher-BasedJudgments of Academic Achievement: A Review of the Literature, 59 REv. OF EDUC. RES. 297 (1989) (reviewing the relationship of teachers' judgments of students' achievements to the students' actual
performance); Irving M. Lane, Paul L. Damiano & Lorne M. Sulsky, DeterminingDecision-MakingEffectiveness Using NCAA Basketball Tournament Results, 17 J. SPORTS BEHAV.
79 (1994) (explaining the comparative ability of six different methods of predicting
the final rankings of college basketball teams); Robert Libby, Ken T. Trotman & Ian
Zimmer, Member Variation, Recognition of Expertise, and Group Performance, 72 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 81 (1987) (studying how well loan officers could evaluate the financial profiles of firms and assessing the likelihood that they would experience bankruptcy);
Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictionsof Violence: Being Accurate about Accuracy, 62 J.
CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCH. 783 (1994) (reporting a meta-analysis of 44 studies
and 58 data sets of the accuracy of expert predictions of violence in mental hospital
patients); Sonya M. Stevens, Douglas K. Richardson, James M. Gray, Donald A.
Goldman, & Marie C. McCormick., Estimating Neonatal Mortality Risk: An Analysis of
Clinicians'Judgments,93 PEDIATRICS 945 (1994) (setting forth a study of the accuracy
of doctors and nurses in assessing the likelihood of survival of seriously ill newborns); Daniel P. Sulmasy, Karen Haller & Peter B. Terry, More Talk, Less Paper: Predicting the Accuracy of Substituted Judgments, 96 Am.J. MED. 432 (1994) (assessing the
ability of family members to discern the treatment preferences of patients). The
specific task of observing complex and subtle stimulus patterns and making judgments about what one sees there - the very kind of cognitive task involved in comparing handwritings - is one of the most well-developed areas of research in other
fields, with many important examples to be found in medical applications (such as
evaluating the effectiveness of various diagnostic tests, such as CT scanning), seeJohn
A. Swets, ROC Analysis Applied to the Evaluation of Medical Imaging Techniques, 14
INVESnGATIVE RADIOLOGY 109 (1979), military applications (such as evaluating the
ability of people to read radar and sonar patterns), see generally W.P. Colquhoun, Sonar Target Detection as a Decision Process, 51 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 187 (1967); C.H. Baker,
Target Detection Performance with a Stationary Radar Sweep-Line, 27 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA
361 (1967), and basic research in psychology (such as studying human visual and
auditory perception), see generally GEORGE A. GESCHEIDER, PSYCHOPHYSICS: METHOD,
THEORY, AND APPLICATION (2d ed. 1985). Moreover, Moenssens sees no contradiction in saying such research cannot be done and then citing to it when it finds graphology wanting, or handwriting identification expertise to appear to exist. See
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 261 n.31, 323-24 nn.312-16 and accompanying text.
See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 313-16. "Celebrate" may be
too weak a word. According to Moenssens, he is the "respected university affiliated
research scientist Dr. Moshe Kam." Id. at 255 n.11. Kam, research scientist at
Drexel University, "heads the data fusion laboratory" and has "written several theses
involving probability and statistics." Id. at 312 n.276. He is "a true scientist," id. at
313 n.280, who acts "[w]ith the admirable restraint of a true scientist," id. at 313
n.279, who acts "in the proper 'scientific' manner," id. at 316, and conducts his stud-
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one is not remiss in expecting to find such research literature. It is
its non-existence that is surprising.
3.

The claim that we erred in concentrating on quantified
validity research and in excluding anecdotal case
studies as data.

Moenssens implies that we were unaware of the mountains of
published reports that support the accuracy of handwriting identification expertise when we published Exorcism in 1989.) On the contrary, as we noted then, our examination of the literature turned up a
large number of such reports, which, in fact, we generally examined,
but which w6 excluded from consideration in our article. As we said
then, except for the reports we examined in the article, "[t]he vast
majority of handwriting 'studies' reported in these publications consist of anecdotal observations, hypothesis creation, and speculation."'
Indeed, in -Science and Nonscience we discussed at some length the
weaknesses of such reports of self belief based on anecdotal evidence 9
On one level, there is no doubt that anecdotal evidence derived
from practice is "empirical" evidence of a sort. An issue in scientific
evaluation of the claims of any field, from astrology to particle physics, is how much reliance to place on such evidence, and there is an
answer which enjoys a fair consensus in the scientific community in
general: "Not much. 40 Further, skepticism toward such evidence is
ies "according to the most rigorous scientific standards," id. at 324 n.316, etc.
37 See id. at 301.
S8 Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 738
n.30.
39 See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supranote 2,
at 41 n.100.
40 The reason is that "a finding of fact is only as good as the methods
used to
find it." MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY §
2-1.1, at 48 (David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks, & Joseph Sanders
eds., 1997) [hereinafter MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE.]. Normal scientists care intensely about methodology and research design. That is because the quality of the
inferences that can be drawn from any empirical data is dependent upon the quality
of the research design. For example, one step up from anecdotal evidence on the
reliability scale are "case studies," yet these are regarded as having "such a total absence of control as to be of almost no scientific value." DONALD T. CAMPBELL &
JuLIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 6
(1966). Put simply, scientists trust better designed studies more than they trust
poorer studies (or no studies at all). Where research designs of varying degrees of
quality (viz., from the weaker case studies or correlational studies to the stronger
quasi-experiments and true randomized experiments) have been used to try to answer the same question, it has been found that the less well controlled the research,
the more enthusiastic the conclusions, and vice versa. SeeJohn P. Gilbert, Bucknam
McPeek, & Frederick Mosteller, Statistics and Ethics in Surgery and Anesthesia, 198
SCIENCE 684 (1977).
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doubly justified in an area (such as handwriting identification and
some other forensic disciplines lacking common non-courtroom applications) where normal practice does not provide unambiguous
feedback concerning the accuracy of conclusions. This was the
whole basis of our criticism, in Science and Nonscience, of Judge
McKenna's analogy of handwriting identification to "harbor piloting"
in his opinion in United States v. Starzecpyzel."' Unlike handwriting
identification experts, harbor pilots have clear feedback as to
whether they have been accurate in every case of practice - they either arrive safely at the right dock or they don't. In an area like
handwriting identification, where such feedback is lacking,42 it would
seem that properly generated validity data would be not merely desirable, but necessary, and the exclusion of anecdotal reports similarly would be not merely justified, but fundamental.43
4.

The claim that we misused or misinterpreted the data

Moenssens thinks we should have ignored certain studies or
drawn from them other conclusions." Once again, Moenssens re41 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience,

supra note 2, at 33-34.
42 See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 33. Consider also
the following testimony in Martin, supra, note 16, by Robert J. Muehlberger, then
chair of the AAFS Questioned Documents Section and vice president of the ASQDE,
and one of the persons credited by Moenssens with helping with Post-Daubert World
Q.In a Laboratory setting where you have a real life problem, how do
you decide that your work is valid?
A. It's by a review process. Another examiner would examine that
case, that problem, basically utilize the reasoning and the methodology we utilize in that laboratory. And if they reach the same conclusion as the first examiner, then we would consider that in fact that
those conclusions are valid and reliable.
Q. And there is no other way to tell whether or not you are correct?
A. In that situation, no.
Id. at 127-28.
Q. Okay. Now, how many times do you think you have been wrong
when you have made a comparison between a questioned document
and a known sample?
A. I wouldn't know.
Q. You don't have any idea?
A. Very few times, I would hope.
Q But you don't know?
A. Exactly, no.
Id. at 141-42.
43 Anecdotal reports function at best as "investigative
leads," to borrow a phrase
from criminal investigation, which are weak evidence in themselves but may properly be used to focus a search for more dependable evidence in a particular direction. At best, they frame questions without providing answers.
44 See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 300-01.
Specifically,
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peats criticisms contained in the Galbraith
article,45 criticisms we
S
46
dealt with in detail in Science and Nonscience. Everyone concedes that
the 1939 Inbau study was so flawed that it provided no meaningful
data on experts' abilities, or their marginal advantage over lay persons, which was our original conclusion. Moenssens criticizes us for
including it at all, since Inbau claimed in an unpublished postExorcism memorandum that the 1939 study was not designed to generate such data.4' Nevertheless, Inbau did not say this in 1939. Test
results by experts were generated and included in the study as published, and we would have been properly criticized for failing to examine it.49 As to the FSF studies, we faced two options in dealing with

them: to dismiss them as meaningless (which would have resulted in
a conclusion that there were no data whatsoever bearing on the validity of handwriting expertise, and also in the proper criticism that we
had failed to present and examine all the available potential data), or
to examine them as potentially meaningful. After all, while it is true
that the FSF said that it regarded the data as inappropriate from
which to draw any conclusions, it seems unlikely that it could have
Moenssens points to Fred E. Inbau, Lay Witness Identification of Handurriting,34 ILL. L.
REV. 433 (1939) [hereinafter "The Inbau study"] and the studies we have referred to
collectively as the FSF studies. See Moenssens, Post-DaubertWorld, supra note 1, at
300-01.
45 See Galbraith et al., supra note
25, at 9-11.
See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, 49-53. Moenssens
adopts a curious tactic in dealing with Science and Nonscience. Regarding that article,
in footnote 7 of Post-Daubert World, he says, "No attempt will be made herein to
make a detailed analysis of the Science and Nonscience article since Dr. Saks graciously
provided this author with a copy of it only a week prior to finalizing the copy of this
article." Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at n.7. Moenssens then goes
on to criticize Science and Nonscience selectively at numerous points, while ignoring
other points made in the article that are apposite to his claims. For the record,
Moenssens was sent a copy of Science and Nonscience in late May or early June of 1997,
oneyearbefore his article was published.
See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 741. The "everyone"
includes
Kam, see Kam I, supra note 8, at 6, the Calbraiths, see Galbraith et al., supra note 25,
at 9, and Moenssens himself, see Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supranote 1, at 300.
48 See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World,
supa note 1, at 301 n.222.
49 For some reason, it appears important to Moenssens to argue
that the Inbau
study was not a "validity study." He wrote:
The Exorcism... authors begin their 'destruction' of handwriting identification lore by discussing the so-called 'Inbau Study' of 1939, which
they called a 'primitive and flawed validity study from nearly 50 years
ago.' The gross mischaracterization of this study alone as a validity test
of the abilities of document examiners casts serious doubt on the research methodology of the Exorcism authors.
Id. at 301 n.222 (quoting Risinger et al., Exorcism, supa note 2, at 738). Moenssens is
simply in error in his characterization. Flawed though it is, the Inbau study meets all
the criteria of a "validity study." See infra at notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
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regarded the exercise as totally without meaning, or it would have
ceased to give the tests or refrained from presenting the data °
There are always various ways of dealing with raw data once generated, and there are always various ways of aggregating data from
separate studies. In both Exorcism and Science and Nonscience, we considered various aggregation strategies, made elections, and spelled
out the assumptions behind those elections.' The Galbraith article
attacked some of those strategies, to which we responded in detail in
Science and Nonscience.52 One striking thing about the Moenssens article is that, unlike the Galbraith piece, it does not attempt to make any
substantive criticism of our data analysis, beyond characterizing it
conclusorily as "'inappropriately-cited percentages and averages, surrounded by deviations and variances, and garnished with a dollop of
Bayesian theory' that provides the veil of legitimacy for otherwise
highly questionable research," quoting a sentence from the Galbraith
article 3 What Moenssens fails to reveal is that the Galbraiths generated their own data analysis table on the same FSF data dealt with in
Exorcism and found that the experts failed to exceed chance (that is,
sheer guessing) on two of six subtasks in those tests.54 Suffice it to say
50 This point was made in Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 42. See the
ob-

servations on possible political motivation, infra note 257 and accompanying text.
51 See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 747-50 (and accompanying footnotes); Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 43-53 (and accompanying footnotes).
5
See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2 at 49-53. The main substantive disagreement between the Galbraiths and ourselves involves how to treat reports labeled "inconclusive" both by the test takers and the FSF, which were sometimes accompanied by narrative statements leaning toward one writer or another.
Our view of the matter parallels the one arrived at by the court in United States v.
Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), after this very issue was considered in
the Daubert hearing in that case:
The document examiners reached the correct answer 52 percent of
the time. The lay persons reached a correct answer 50 percent of the
time. The Galbraiths then took the document examiners' answers and
the lay people's 'inconclusives,' and they fiddled with them .... And
then came up with a more impressive difference.
Id. at 1037.
53 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 306 (quoting Galbraith et al.,
supra note 25, at 15). The uncareful reader might think this comment was a criticism directed at something that actually existed in the Exorcism article, but it was instead a vague and unaimed shot fired by the Galbraiths at nothing in particular.
The Galbraith article did not actually apply the quoted description of what they
called "statistical innumeracy" directly to us, and rightly so, since, for instance, we
didn't garnish anything in either article with a "dollop of Bayesian theory." Moenssens has reloaded the same missile and fired it again in our general direction without hitting anything.
Galbraith et al., supra note 25, at 15 tbl.3, reproduced in Science and Nonscience,
supra note 2, at 52. Moenssens did not think this remarkable finding to be worthy of
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that we believe the fair-minded reader who considers what we actually wrote and how we approached the data will conclude that we
were quite justified in our conclusions in 1989: that, while future
tests might "show document examiners faring better," in light of the
FSF studies the corpus of available evidence on the existence of
handwriting identification expertise went "from no data to negative
data" and that in its most charitable light and taking into account the
flaws in the FSF studies, the most that could be said at that time was
that "no available evidence demonstrates
the existence of handwrit55
ing identification expertise.

One final observation is in order in this section. Throughout
the Moenssens article there is the clear implication that if we had limited our 1989 observations to non-Osbornian handwriting experts we
would have been justified, but the real sin of Exorcism was our inclusion of Osbornians in our global conclusions. 56 This position overlooks the fact, implied in Exorcism and made explicit in Science and
Nonscience, that all the available data, meaningful or not, have been
generated by tests run on Osbornians. 57 Therefore there are still no
data explicitly on graphologically oriented practitioners. Testing
might show them doing worse, but it remains a possibility that it
might show them doing better. Such a result might be counterintuitive, because of the claimed superiority of Osbornians in training,
experience, and method, but there are counterintuitive precedents
for such things in other fields and some counterintuitive data in this
field.58 We remain firmly agnostic.5 9
sharing with his readers, though the Starzecpyzel court took note of it. See Starzecpyzel,

880 F. Supp. at 1037.
55

Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 750-51.
See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 264 n.41, 303 n.231 & 307

n.248.

57 To date, all studies, including the AAFS studies and both Kam
studies, have
been run on document examiners from government laboratories, and "since government laboratories tend to be officially Osbornian, if there are few data on the
dependability of identification of authorship by Osbornian practitioners, there are
none on the dependability of graphologically oriented practitioners." Risinger &
Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 298 n.2 10. Moenssens apparently agrees
about the population of the tested universe:

A sizable number of the traditional questioned document examiners
are employed in crime laboratories and in local, state or federal law

enforcement units. However enough of them are retired from public

service and have entered into the private practice of forensic document examination so that defense lawyers have equal access to their
services. By contrast, most of the graphoanalysts are in the private
practice, either full time or part time.
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 264-65.
58

There is reason to believe that the accuracy of predictions of future danger-
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The Kam Studies

Professor Moenssens entertains not an iota of doubt concerning
handwriting identification dependability based on the data generated
by the FSF tests reported in Exorcism (or the further negative data
from 1988 and 1989 FSF tests reviewed in Science and Nonscience); nor
does he entertain any doubts that experienced Osbornian experts are
substantially more accurate in their identifications than virtually any
untrained juror. However, Professor Moenssens takes the position
that, were any such doubts ever justified, they have been totally and
completely dispelled as the result of the work of Dr. Moshe Kam,
specifically his 1997 study (Kam II). 60 Moenssens asserts that this
study "laid to rest, for all objective reviewers, the debate over whether
professional document examiners can reliably identify authors of
handwriting and possess a skill that is absent in the general population, ' and "shows conclusively that questioned document examiners
possess a skill in identifying writers of documents that is not possessed by lay persons. ' 2
In this, Professor Moenssens is triply misled: First, no single
study can show anything that conclusively; 63 second, the Kam II study
ousness is either unaffected or negatively affected by training in psychiatry. See the
authorities collected in Exorcism, supra note 2, at 750 n.80. See asoJohn Monahan,
Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Dangerousness, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, su-

pra note 40, § 7. And in regard to accuracy of handwriting identification, the FSF
data showed no significant correlation between accuracy and time on task, and only
marginally significant correlation between accuracy and years of experience. See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 785-87 app.2.
59 Note that we see no reason to believe that graphologically oriented practitioners are any better, and would certainly not be surprised if they were worse. Nevertheless, observations similar to the ones above have prompted Moenssens to imply
that somehow we are supporters of the graphologists. It is at that point where we
begin to feel we are being attacked more for heresy than anything else.
See Kam II, supra note 8.
61 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra
note 1, at 314.
62 Id. at 324. The cited quotations are but two of a series of encomiums
paid Dr.

Kam by Moenssens. See supra note 36.
63 A well-established understanding among empirical researchers is that replication and extension are necessary to the development of knowledge, first to establish
the generality of a finding (can it be repeated? does it hold beyond the narrow set of
circumstances of any one study?) and, second, to find the boundary conditions beyond which the finding does not hold. To expect any one study to accomplish so
much is extravagant. See ROBERT ROSENTHAL & RALPH L. ROSNOW, ESSENTIALS OF
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 111, 182 (1984).
According to Rosenthal and Rosnow,
"Replication is science's empirical system of checks and balances to expose and reduce errors of observation," and "The crucial role of replication is well established in
science generally .... " Id. On many, if not most, important questions, dozens, if
not hundreds, of studies can be found exploring various aspects of these questions.
It should be noted that the United States Department ofJustice apparently does not
share Moenssens' view that things have been laid totally to rest. In June of 1998 the
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had several serious flaws, which leave open questions as to its actual
meaning;6 and third, even taken at face value, the study does not
mean what Moenssens (or Kam, for that matter)65 seems to claim for
it.

No matter how hard the forensic science community wishes for a
single magic bullet, which will dispatch all doubts, science just does
not work that way, especially in an area like handwriting identification where actual practice involves a range of tasks widely varying in
difficulty. A single, unreplicated study does not establish much under any circumstances,6 and no single test can map the terrain of dependability in a complex area such as handwriting identification.67
This is not to say that such individual studies are valueless - far from
it. These studies mark the beginnings of real knowledge. While we
have been searching in our criticism of both the Galbraith study
National Institute of Justice (the Justice Department's research agency) issued a solicitation for research proposals on "Forensic Document Examination Validation
Studies." The solicitation document says that the procedures of document examiners "must be tested statistically in order to demonstrate that following the stated procedures allows analysts to produce correct results with acceptable error rates."
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,
VALIDATION STUDIES (June 1998).

SOUCITATION, FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION

in fact is engaged in a program of research, with each study trying to improve upon and fill in the gaps of the previous one. Criticisms of Kam I led to the
improved research design of Kam II. Criticisms by Denbeaux and direct communications between Saks and Kam about the design flaws of Kam II led to the tests that
were conducted for Kam III. See Deposition of Moshe Kam at 48-49, United States v.
Gilreath, No. 96-CR-472 JTC (N.D. Ga. Dec. 4, 1997) (unpublished, copies on file
with authors) [hereinafter Gilreath depositions]. This is an example of how knowledge development in science proceeds (notwithstanding Kam's extravagant pronouncement in Kam II of the end of history in this area of inquiry. See infra note
6Kam

65.).

65 In Kam II, Dr. Kam makes the following statement, which
is an extraordinarily
extravagant statement to be made by a serious scientist reporting the results of a single study: "[T]he results of our test lay to rest the debate over whether or not professional document examiners possess writer-identification skills absent in the general population. They do." Kam II, supra note 8, at 778 and repeated in substance
on page 785. This is the same article that Moenssens has characterized as showing
"the admirable restraint of a true scientist." Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra
note 1, at 313 n.279. See also supra note 36.
firSee supra note 63.
67 Kam himself is well aware of this. When asked
by Judge Carnes in the Martin
case if evaluating individual document examiner competence would require "a
fuller battery of tests" than the test performed in Kam II, Kam replied:
Yes. If I were requested not to answer the questions that I have answered but to try to answer the question what is an appropriate set of
tests in order to tell that someone is good enough at a certain reliability level, I'll have to work on it. I mean, this doesn't answer it. I'll have
to work on it. It would be a study bigger than this.
Martin Transcript, supra note 16, at 237.
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(which Moenssens rather unaccountably fails to describe) and the
first Kam study (which Moenssens also fails to describe) in our previous writings," we have, we believe, been appropriately open in stating
what these two studies taken together tend to suggest tentatively, at
least as to the very limited and artificial tasks tested: the possible aggregate superiority of experts as a group in avoiding false positive at9 and the heavily bimodal performtributions under test conditions,4
ance of non-experts, with the top half of non-experts approaching
the bottom portion of the experts in performance even as to false
positives.
Which brings us to Kam II, and why it cannot deliver what
Moenssens claims for it. Between the beginning of May and the end
of September 1996, Kam, Fielding, and Conn administered a test of
their own design to three groups of about thirty-five questioned
document examiners each, a group of eight document examiner
trainees, and a group of forty-one untrained non-experts.7
The test materials were generated as follows: 150 persons, ages
twenty to twenty-seven, were selected by an unknown protocol to provide writing samples, and they agreed to do so. Each writer worked
on a wide and well-lit table in a classroom setting. Each writer generated twelve documents on eight and one-half by eleven inch, twenty
pound white paper, copying three short assigned texts four times
each. Each writer used pens supplied by the test designers, both blue
medium Bic pens and black medium Bic pens, and each was told to
use both colors, switching "every 2-3 documents," so each writer created both blue and black documents in no exact fixed ratio or order.
68 See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 58 (discussing Gal-

braith study), 59-63 (discussing Kam I). In attacking this evaluation of Kam I,
Moenssens typically characterizes it as a "denigration" "by a non-scientist lawyer of
the work of a true scientist." Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 313
n.280. Saks, who stands behind our discussion of Kam I, takes umbrage at this characterization - he has always regarded himself as a non-lawyer scientist. For a discussion of Dr. Saks's qualifications, see infra note 240.
69 It cannot be stated too often that any superiority on the part of
document examiners under test conditions, if it truly exists, will not necessarily carry over to actual practice, where the pressures on document examiners, as on other forensic
practitioners, are to make matches that confirm positions already arrived at by other
investigators, a fact recognized by Moenssens himself in other writings. See the quotations collected infra at note 283.
70 See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 61. No one
could
begin to guess this evenhandedness of our evaluation from reading Moenssens' article.
71 See Kam II, supra note 8, at 779-81. All details of Kam II test procedures are
drawn from pages 779-81 of that eight-page article. Because the material is so short,
specific footnote references to pages are omitted as unnecessary and burdensome to
the reader.
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This resulted in 1800 documents, four each of three texts by 150
writers. Thirty of those writers were then selected (presumably at
random) and all the documents generated by those thirty (360
documents) were placed in a set. These documents were then coded
with random numbers for writer identity. Random documents were
then drawn from the set of 360 until six documents by six different
writers were obtained (that is, after drawing the first document, if the
second document was by the same writer, it was returned to the pool
and another was drawn, and so forth, until a set of 6 documents by 6
different writers was obtained). These documents could represent
randomly any text and either color ink. This set of six was then labeled "Unknown Al." The same process was repeated until twelve
such sets were obtained (Unknowns Al through A12) which together
contained seventy-two documents in twelve sets of six each, each of
the six by a different writer in each set. The remaining 288 documents were then randomly distributed into twelve sets referred to as
"database packages," (database Al through A12), each containing
twenty-four random documents. 2 A similar process was undertaken
with the remaining documents not in set A, generating a set B, with
the same subset characteristics, and so on until there were five such
universes, A-E, containing twelve six-document "Unknown" sets each
and twelve twenty-four-document "database" sets each. Each test participant was tested by randomly selecting a Universe A-E, then within
that Universe randomly selecting an "unknown" set from the twelve,
and randomly selecting a "database" set from the twelve. The researchers then explained to the test subject that the "unknown" sets
contained six writings by six different writers without disguise, and
asked the test participant to determine whether any document or
documents in the "database" set of twenty-four were written by any
writer represented in the "unknown" set.
The report of the study is a bit hazy in setting forth the limiting
conditions of the sets so generated, therefore, we have a problem in
figuring out the specifics on this point. It is inexplicit whether, once

72

The use of the label "unknown" was somewhat problematic.

Among docu-

ment examiners, "unknown" is the label given to a document of unknown authorship to be compared with standards of known authorship. In the Kam II test, none
of the documents in either "unknown" sets or "database" sets were unknowns in this
sense. They were in fact functionally the same from that perspective: Both sets were
known to the testers and unknown to the test takers. The test was thus the same
kind of sorting test involved in Kam I. Moenssens seems to have been misled to
some extent by the label, because he refers to the documents in the database sets as
"knowns," when in fact they were no more "knowns" than the "unknowns." See
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supranote 1, at 314
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"Unknown Al" was generated, the writers there represented were
removed, so that set A2 would have six writers who were different
from each other and also all different from the ones in set Al, or
whether the process was simply repeated on all the documents remaining after the generation of set Al, in which case set A2 could, in theory, contain the exact same writers as Al. It appears that the latter
must be the case, because with twelve sets of four, one would need
forty-eight writers to have no overlaps, and there were only thirty
writers in the pool. In the latter case, it is possible (though unlikely)
that each set Al thru A12 represented exactly the same six writers,
since each writer had generated twelve documents. Similarly, in regard to the "database" sets, in the event of the distribution just described, afortiori, no "database" set would, or could, contain a document truly matching one in an "unknown" set. This theoretical (and
very remote) possibility is only important to understand the real
meaning of the first three tables in the Kam II report. These tables
are obviously descriptive of the distribution of matches in the actual
tests as given to the participants, not of the probability of such
matches resulting from the distribution process described above.
Thus, while there is a statistical probability that some test might be
administered that had no true matches, in the 154 tests actually run
there was always at least one true positive match. Similarly, at the
other extreme, though there is a remote possibility of as high as
eighteen true matches, in the actual 154 tests administered there
were never more than ten.
Before we look at the published results of these tests, let us examine the test design, and the limits of what we might expect that it
can and cannot tell us. First, like Kam I, this is a multi-document
sorting test of a type encountered rarely, if at all, in actual practice.73
This is not to say the results are meaningless. As we said in Science
and Nonscience in regard to the similar characteristics of Kam I, "the
ability to accurately perceive diagnostic patterns of similarity and difference in the writing represented by the test materials would likely
be common to both the test and to many kinds of real-life problems. ''7 4 The limitations of the Kam II test are mentioned merely to
73 Kam states that the "format of the test was selected to resemble a multi-suspect
case in which extensive examination of documents was required," but in fact, because there were multiple documents in each comparison set, none of which were
known as to origin by the examiner, it resembles no real case. Kam II, supra note 8,
at 780. Perhaps it would be better if real cases were presented to examiners in this
blind a fashion, but they are not. See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra
note 2, at 64.
74 Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 60.
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caution against simple extrapolation to actual practice without further thought.
Second, there are problems of motivation with regard to some
study participants. Professional document examiners would be expected to put in more focused effort, given that their careers (and
the fate of their profession) are in some sense on the line, than
would graduate students merely participating in a study. This gap in75
the motivation of study participants was a serious problem in Kam I
However, in Kam II, the study designers have made a commendable
attempt to correct for this factor by offering the non-experts a schedule of monetary rewards and penalties. Unhappily, the schedule of
rewards and penalties utilized was particularly unfortunate and problematical. The non-experts were told that they would receive a
twenty-five dollar participation fee, and that their payment would not
go below this regardless of actual performance. They were then told
they would receive an additional twenty-five dollars for each "true
positive" match, that they would lose twenty-five dollars for each
"false positive" match, 6 that they would lose ten dollars for failing to
see a true match, and that they would gain nothing for accurately rejecting a non-match. This payoff schedule may be schematically represented by the following matrix:

See id. at 61.
Note that under the stated reward scheme, if you had no idea of whether
any
of the documents in fact matched, the incentive would be to take one random guess
of a match, which would be free since you couldn't lose the $25 participation fee,
and you might get lucky.
75
76

19981

REPLY TO MOENSSENS

Reality:

Match
Decision:

Non-Match

Match

Non-Match

True
Positive
+25
(Very Good)

False
Positive
-25
(Very Bad)

False
Negative
-10
(Bad)

True
Negative
0
(Indifferent)

Under this regime, if the non-expert participants' objective was
to maximize their payoff, they would guess a match whenever it appeared to them to be as likely as a non-match. This is because, over
the long run, it would appear that such a strategy would at least break
even, whereas guessing "no match" on such an evaluation would lose
an average of five dollars per guess over the long run." Plus, there
was no real incentive to avoid false positives for fear of actually losing
something they already had at the beginning of the test because they
were guaranteed the twenty-five dollar participation fee no matter
how bad their performance. This reward schedule seems guaranteed
to make the non-experts risk-preferring regarding finding positive
matches, even in the face of instructions that they should declare a
match only if they were absolutely sure. The effect of the payoff
structure compounds the well-known tendency for a majority of people to become risk-preferring in circumstances of potential high rewards and low costs, regardless of rational odds (sometimes referred
to as the lottery effect)."'

77 This strategy would be expected to lose $10 half the time (when the guess was
wrong) and gain nothing the other half (when the guess was right).
78 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Lola L. Lopes, Remodeling Risk Aversion, in
ACTING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: MULTIDISCIPLINARY CONCEPTIONS 267 (George M. von
Furstenberg ed., 1990); Lola L. Lopes, When Time Is of the Essence: Averaging, Aspiration, and the Short Run, 65 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HuMAN DECISION PROCESSES 179 (1996);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).
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In contrast, the document examiners entered the test under
quite a different effective payoff schedule. Foremost, they knew that
the worst thing for a professional document examiner to do on any
proficiency test is to commit a false positive error.79

(This risk

averseness to false positives on known tests is not necessarily present
in normal practice, for a variety of reasons discussed supra, at note
69). Secondly, for the document examiners, a correct detection of a
non-match is also a highly desirable indicator of affirmative expertise.
The incentive matrix for document examiners taking the Kam II test
might be represented as follows:
Reality:
Match

Non-Match

Match

True
Positive
(Very Good)

False
Positive
(Extremely
Bad)

Non-Match

False
Negative
(Bad)

True
Negative
(Good)

Decision:

Thus, in a situation of equipoise, this reward structure would
impel experts toward declaring a non-match, and the non-experts
toward declaring a match.
Hence, the experts and non-experts took the tests under different incentive structures, which would be expected to yield more false
positives for the non-experts 0 even under equally accurate probability judgments about authorship. '
See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 315. Such a false positive
in the real world can result in the conviction of an innocent criminal defendant, a
result the official ideology of our criminal justice system disvalues much more than
an inaccurate acquittal, as reflected in the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, for an expert to commit such an error on a proficiency test undermines the status of the expertise in the eyes of the law, and therefore must be
avoided at all costs in tests. Whether a false positive must be as stringently avoided in
practice is a different issue. See supra note 69.
80 To correct for this, future tests should impose
high disincentives on the nonexperts for false positive responses, substantially higher than the reward for true
79
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Third, and somewhat unaccountably, is the "ink color" variable,
also present in Kam I. It is not clear why the writers of the exemplars
were asked to use two different color inks. The effects of the different inks on the results, or on the aggregate results between groups,
cannot be assumed a priorito be trivial. As we said in Science and Nonscience, this "introduced a variable into the study's design having unknown impact and no apparent relevance to the issue of identification from form. 82 Nevertheless, this additional variable is probably

positives, and equalize the gain and loss for true negatives and false negatives
(missed matches).
Scientists who study decision-making of the sort engaged in by forensic scientists, an area of research called "Signal Detection Theory," have developed ways of
measuring the raw acuity of sonar operators, radiologists, or document examiners
separate from the subjective threshold that an observation must cross in order for
examiners to decide that what they have observed is a submarine or a tumor or a
handwriting "match." Such research has found that incentives for preferring to err
in one way (a false negative: failing to detect a tumor) rather than another (a false
positive: seeing a tumor where there is none) typically have considerable impact on
where the psychological threshold is placed, regardless of the raw perceptual accuracy of the examiner. See John A. Swets, The Science of Choosing the Right Decision
Threshold in High-Stakes Diagnostics, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 522 (1992).

(Note that be-

cause of its human component, this research is significantly different from its related
computerized cousin, Pattern Recognition, in which Dr. Kam is an expert. See
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 312 n.276.)
1 In a recently published Article, The Effects of Monetary Incentives on Document Ex-

amination Professionals, 43 J. FORENSIC SC. 1000 (Sept. 1998) [hereinafter Kam III],
Kam et al. administered the Kam II test to four sets of laypersons under four different incentive schemes and found no significant difference in result among the four
test groups. We make the following observations:
1. None of the incentive schemes tested had the characteristics outlined in note
80, supra.

2. The findings are surprisingly at odds with the general results of similar incentive studies in other areas. See supra note 80.
3. While there appeared to be no significant differences among the four newly
tested lay groups attributable to the different incentive schemes, the aggregate performance of the newly tested lay groups showed a 41% improvement in avoiding
false positives compared to the original Kam II lay group. (The wrong association
rate dropped from .383 to .227.) This is a startling volatility of result, given the same
task, and it raises substantial questions about the reliability of all of Kam's lay person
test results. Kam tries to argue that this precipitous (and statistically significant, Z =
1.85) decrease in false positives is accounted for by a general tendency of Kam III
subjects to declare fewer matches of any kind, giving them "a lower (worse) hit rate."
Kam III, supra, at 1000. However, Kam fails to perform any significance tests to back
up this claim. In fact, there is no significant difference in hit rate between Kam II
and Kam III non-professionals (Z = 0.034, p is nonsignificant).
Professor Denbeaux has noted this volatility of result in testimony concerning a
draft of Kam III, but this testimony was not included in Kam III's rather selective
Appendix of Denbeaux's testimony.
SRisinger

& Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 59 n.142.
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best regarded as simply another subtask variable of the type inevitably
present in the tests as designed, for reasons explained below.83
Fourth, a much more serious problem with the Kam II study is
the possibility that some of the document examiners (but not the
non-expert participants) had helpful information about the test in
advance of its administration.84 Apparently, Kam allowed the earlier
document examiner test subjects to review the results of their tests at
some point before the next document examiner groups were tested.'
Now, Kam claims to have protected against this having any effect by
making sure that no pairing of a set of "unknowns" and a set of
"database" documents was ever used twice. However, it should be
obvious that quite a lot of useful test design information might be
gleaned in such a session. For instance, if you know how the data
base was generated, you can figure out pretty quickly how poor in
true matches the tests are likely to be, that is, what the rough probabilities of maximum and minimum numbers of true positives are.
Such information was not available to the non-experts, who might be
expected to assume a universe much richer in matches, which would
encourage guessing. Furthermore, while the document examiners
were divided into three regional groups for statistical purposes, the
members of at least the Northeast group were tested in at least two
different sub-groups at two different times, with their results being
aggregated statistically. Thus, there were four different physical
groups of experts tested at four different times, and the first group
might have had valuable information that could be passed to the
members of the other groups. It seems especially unnecessary to
83
84

See infra text accompanying and preceding note 86.
See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 62. (discussing this problem in re-

gard to Kam I, which in that study rendered it impossible to know if individual performances were in fact group performances in regard to the document examiners
tested).
85 It is not fully explicit that this occurred.
Kam says that, because "unknown"
and "database" pairings were never repeated,
Even if correct results from an early test were fully known to all testtakers in a later session, this information was practically useless. We do
not believe that any attempt was made to record or share results from
our tests between test-takers. However, if such attempts were made,
they could not affect the results in a meaningful way.
Kam II, supra note 8, at 779. We take this to mean that results were provided the test
takers at some point in advance of the next group of tests. In order to make sure
this occurred, Saks has repeatedly requested explicit clarification from Kam, by email, telephone, and by regular mail, but Kam has not responded. Under these circumstances, we have proceeded on the assumption that, based upon Kam's statement, at some point test subjects reviewed the results of their tests. This is one more
illustration of the hidden pitfalls of human testing that may not be immediately apparent to the researcher more accustomed to computer modeling.
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have run the tests in such a way as to create this problem, since all
that was necessary was to collect all the data before conducting any
post-mortem analyses.
Fifth, and finally, the actual tests presented an unknown variety
of subtasks in an unknown distribution. In addition, some important
varieties of subtask were clearly absent from the test, and as to those,
the test can generate no direct data of any kind. Let us expand a little on this. Like the Kam I universe of writing exemplars, the much
larger and more controlled universe generated for Kam II was generated with no attempt at isolating subtasks (for instance comparing
two exemplars with similar but unusual "class characteristics," such as
the handwriting of two German immigrants of similar age and sex).
Any such subtask might have been present somewhere in some run of
the test, but we do not know which were, which were not, or when.
This is not necessarily a criticism, but it must be kept in mind when
determining what the test can tell us. Each test was a little different,
presenting a different set of challenges, and the most that can be said
is that the challenges are likely to be typical of a certain range of
comparison situations. They are also unlikely to mirror those encountered in litigation. This is because many of the subtask problems are likely to be trivial, like distinguishing between two randomly
selected humans of all races and sexes, since the exemplars were
generated with no apparent attempt to make the set of materials
richer in confusingly similar exemplars than random life would be.86
Most importantly, some very critical subtasks were not under test at
all, such as the effects of forgery or disguise, the particular problems
of signatures or adolescent handwriting, or those of the elderly or infirm, or the like. However, with these limitations in mind, and within
the range of aggregate subtasks present in the tests, the tests can
generate, and would be expected to generate the following important types of data:
1. The aggregate performance of the professional document
examiner group as to true positives, false positives, true negatives, and false negatives.
2. The aggregate performance of each subgroup of professional
document examiners as to the same categories of result.
3. The aggregate performance of the trainee group as to the
same categories of result.

See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 64 (for a discussion of the same
problem in Kam I).
86
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4. The aggregate performance of the non-expert group as to the
same categories of result.
5. The distribution of performances among the professional
document examiner group (best score, worst score, distribution in between, as to all categories of result).
6. Same for sub-groups.
7. Same for trainees.
8. Same for non-experts.
Indeed, these data are so important that, with a small universe of
154 test administrations, one might expect to see a frequency distribution, or even a data table giving each taker's (unidentified by
name) individual scores, as was done in Kam I. In the Kam II report,
however, all that is given is the aggregate performance of groups, and
that only in numerical averages. There is no distribution information given at all, even in the form of standard deviation values. It's
not that this information does not exist or was not available to Kam.
Itjust is not given in the report.
Think of what this means. We do not know how well the best lay
people performed, or how poorly the worst document examiners
performed. Kam knows, we don't. The aggregate data establish that
there is no significant difference in the average performance of experts and non-experts in regard to true positives. It is only in regard
to false positives, admittedly the more dangerous type of error, that
document examiners have a significant aggregate advantage. However, without distribution information, we do not know if, for instance, the better half of the non-experts is as good or better at avoiding false positives as the worse half of the document examiners.
The above example is not as farfetched as it might sound. The
data from the Galbraith study and from Kam I tended to indicate that
non-experts were bimodal in their accuracy distribution, including
false positives. If that trend were to hold in Kam II, the best of the
non-experts could still be better than the worst of the experts, but the
average for non-experts would be dragged down by the really poor
performance of the worst of the non-experts. Similarly, the high average for document examiners could conceal a cluster of really poor
performers on the low end.8 These data exist but were not pub87

Note that the proper conclusion is "no significant difference," not "accept" the

null hypothesis as Kam mistakenly concludes in Kam II. See Kam II, supra note 8, at
784 tbls. 10, 11, 13, 15, and accompanying text. A null hypothesis is only a starting
point for a scientific study. Based on evidence, it can be rejected. But the failure to
reject it as false is not the equivalent of "accepting" it as true.
88 We are well aware that the test design, which
resulted in each test adminis-
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lished. What is worse, Kam has repeatedly refused requests from us
and others to produce these data.8 9 Under such circumstances
tered being different from every other, and each test participant therefore taking a
somewhat different test, makes statements about comparative individual performance problematic, absent some way to rate the relative difficulty of particular tests.
Nevertheless, other moments of the distributions have as much claim to meaning
from these data as the one Kam chose to publish, but these cannot be derived without the data.
89
Kam originally agreed to share his data in January of 1997:
Q. In your 1994 tables [from Kam I], you actually could tell if some
students made a lot of mistakes versus very few?

A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Can you tell that from the new studies?
A. From the new, no. But because of the fact that I imagine that this
will be of interest to many people, I will make it available. The only
problem is that if I send to the journal a table of 147 entries, I mean I
don't even know how to print it. I'll make - I mean I'll make it available.
Martin Transcript, supra note 16, at 217. Kam then goes on to caution against unsophisticated comparison of individual performances from the raw data because, as we
have noted supra note 85, each test was a little different, presumably some much
harder and some much easier. We, of course, intend no unsophisticated comparisons.

No data were ever forthcoming in response to requests, however, and by March
of 1998, Kam explicitly changed his position and now refuses to share his data:
Q. Do you have other concerns about, and again we've heard the
complaints, essentially, that your data is not being shared. Do you
have other responses to that criticism?
A. I keep hearing that I should share my raw data and I would like to
know, first of all, what is meant by that? If it means that I have to go
and show these, I object to that. I have a proprietor recording on
these things. I mean, there is tests designed - I mean unless - I
mean if the Journal of Forensic Science want to order me, that's absolutely fine. But to go just because someone wants to look at these
things because they have some hypothesis of some need to show that
what I have done is wrong and go ahead and distribute to the whole
world how I do my testing and how I do the coding, I object to that.
Secondly, I'm not done. There are some things I want to know from
this data that I either couldn't finish yet or I don't have right now the
funds to do and I am soliciting funds to do. Let me give you one example. I want to know, in this test and some cases, the examiner had
the same text to compare and sometimes the examiner had 2 different
tests to compare. I want to know if there was much more success,
maybe, in one of these, in other words, for example, if it was the same
text, the people were more successful. I want to know. I didn't do it
yet. I want to know if the existence of certain characteristics, in some
of the text, or in some combination of the text, I - I'm not done.
And now I'm asked somehow to just, you know, take everything and
give it to anybody. I'm not done with my research and that's our research. We have done the work. People who want the research can do
research, but its our data. There is also, I must tell you, the issue ofit's very much seems from the things that we are asked to do and from
the complaints that there is an attempt to misinterpret our data. This
business with how many people contributed to the bad results is that a
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(which hardly come up to the usually stated ideals of science),90 one
can be forgiven for suspecting that the distribution data would show
clear attempt to misinterpret the data and I must admit that I am not,
you know, jumping up and down with joy to help to misinterpret my
results. I don't think that the people who asked for this data are necessarily, have the necessary expertise. Nobody has ever asked me for
data in the past except for colleagues who want to initiate a joint project on the same thing - myself with others. They don't just go
around asking for data. If I don't agree, I go ahead and I work. I do
my tests. I do my research. And there's also finally, and I understand
that this perhaps is the easiest thing to address the issues of confidentiality, if I am ever to release data, I have to go through the dramatic something I must do, mark out the names. It's handwriting recognition, okay? I'll - We'll have to retype the whole thing. Therefore, I
don't have any legal or ethical obligation to do this. The thing for
which this is asked of me is to misinterpret it, by you know this contribution of different people and I don't want to do it.
Transcript of Proceedings at 261-63, Estate of John E. Acuff v. O'linger, No. 6064
(Tenn. Ch. Ct. Mar. 25, 1998) (transcript accurately reproduced).
Apparently Saks is regarded by Kam as not having the necessary expertise, since
he has failed to respond to numerous requests from Saks to share his data. Interestingly, Dr. Saks is amenable to ajoint research project, and has suggested this to Kam
in writing, but Kam did not respond to the invitation.
0 One ideal of science is that data should be shared with the scientific
community:
If all science were conducted according to an ideal, referred to by
Robert Merton as the "ethos of science," then scientific findings would
be made available to the entire community. Since the purpose of this
availability is to allow others to assess the merits of the research, the
need for careful description of study procedures is implicit. We believe that, in addition, the availability of the data for scrutiny and reanalysis should be part of the presentation of results. In the past,
among the best investigators and with a journal practice open to extensive description, providing data was an honored tradition. Cavendish's classic paper on the density of the earth is a prime example.
Scientific inquiry must be open, and the sharing of data serves to
make it so. Disputes among scientists are common; without the availability of data, the diversity of analyses and conclusions is inhibited,
and scientific understanding and progress are impeded.
Report of the Committee on National Statistics, in SHARING RESEARCH DATA 9-10

(Stephen E. Fienberg, Margaret E. Martin, & Miron L. Straf eds., 1985) (citations
omitted). The reasons given by Kam, which are set forth in supra note 89, for not
sharing data are all dealt with in that volume and found wanting. Kam's claim to a
proprietary interest in publicly funded research data is interesting but ultimately
unpersuasive. Most government research grants mandate data sharing, and even if
the FBI does not, public policy demands that publicly funded research data be available to the public unless there is some other good reason to withhold it. "Certainly
data collected by government agencies, to the extent that questions of confidentiality and national interest are not present, should be readily and promptly available
for research applications. The same rule should be followed for data collections commissioned for purposes of public policy andfor performanceevaluation."Jerome M. Clubb, Erik
W. Austin, Carolyn L. Geda, & Michael W. Traugott, Sharing Research Data in the Social Sciences, in SHARING RESEARH DATA, supra, at 74 (emphasis added). In the terms
of Recommendation 3 of the Committee on National Statistics: "Data relevant to

1998]

REPLY TO MOENSSENS

433

bimodality for the performance of the non-experts and poor performance by a significant cluster of document examiners.
We hope it is now apparent why Kam's conclusion that the results of Kam II "laid to rest... the debate over whether professional
document examiners ... possess a skill that is absent in the general
population" is more than a little overstated. A more proper conclusion would be that under test conditions not replicating actual practice in significant ways, and as to an undefined range of subtasks not
including many of the most important ones of actual forensic practice,9 the aggregate average performance of document examiners at
avoiding false positives was better than that of non-experts, but that
this may be an artifact of the varying incentive and disincentive regimes applying to the two groups, perhaps compounded by other factors. More importantly, there is nothing to show that the experts'
relative advantage in avoiding false positives when performing on a
known test, even if real, is robust enough to persist in the face of expectancy and suggestion effects (properly) excluded from the test,
but present in normal practice. This question can only be answered
by tests specifically directed toward this issue, or a regime of blind
proficiency testing.
C. Professor Moenssens, the Supreme Court, and the Label "Science"
In Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., the Supreme Court
recognized the general problem of invalidated expertise in the
courtroom and the special problem of expertise representing itself as
"science." That special problem springs from the likelihood that juries may be particularly ill-equipped to judge the weight to be given
to testimony allegedly derived from "science," and in addition, they92
may be especially prone to overvalue evidence carrying that label.
public policy should be shared as quickly and widely as possible." Report of the
Committee on National Statistics, supra, at 27.
Clubb questions whether the researchers' usual time-bound monopoly on first
analysis should apply to such data, but even if it does, the norm in the scientific
community is a duration of one to two years from the initial data collection. See
Clubb et al., supra, at 74. The time is now up for Kam's data. In addition, the fear
of "misinterpretation" by "unqualified" investigators is not a valid reason to refuse to
share data even though such fear may be inevitable. See id. at 57-58; Terry E.
Hedrick, Justificationsfor and Obstacles to Data Sharing, in SHARING RESEARCH DATA, supra, at 133, 137.
Finally, the very notion of confidentiality in regard to such public interest data
on competency and performance of public employees or forensic experts is somewhat problematic, but Kam himself admits it is easily dealt with by redaction.
Where now the "true scientist?"
91
92

See supra notes 73, 85.

Professor Moenssens has recognized the problem in past writings:

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29:405

This at least is the law's traditional concern. The Court's opinion
makes clear that under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the trial judge
has a general gatekeeping function to evaluate the minimum acceptable dependability
of all proffered expert testimony, regardless of its
"novelty.""3 The Daubert Court attempts to define serious standards
for discharging that threshold gatekeeping function in regard to
"scientific" evidence, without attempting to map the contours of expertise in general, without giving much guidance on the proper
standards for "non-science" expertise, or without stating whether
varying threshold standards may be appropriate to different subsets
of the category of "non-science" expertise.
Professor Moenssens disagrees with the concept of science he
finds in Daubert. He believes that Dauberl's explicit standard should
be limited to what he calls "the 'experimental science' model of Sir
Isaac Newton. 94 Most areas of clinical practice, including handwriting identification, Moenssens would dub "science" of another stripe, 95
and he suggests another set of threshold criteria to be applied to
them, which he claims will be an appropriate
proxy for the validity
96
requirements articulated in Daubert.
To be sure, the Daubert opinion is not the most sophisticated
document ever drafted on the modem concept of science. However,
the general notion it reflects is reasonably clear. The Daubert Court
[J]uries have been conditioned by the novels they read and the television programs they watch to believe that science can do anything and
that scientific evidence is always accurate. When experts testify in a
criminal case, the jury frequently perceives that the testimony's value
or reliability is far greater than the underlying principles or techniques
would justify.
Andre Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence - An Alternative to the Frye Rule,
25 WM. & MARYL. REv 545, 567 (1984) [hereinafter Moenssens, Admissibility].
93 "[W]e do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence. Of course, well-established propositions are less
likely to be challenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 n.l1 (1993)
(unanimous as to that part of decision). Moenssens seems strangely unaware of this
language. He writes:
The case did suggest that the trial judge act as a gatekeeper to prevent
the admission of 'unreliable' evidence, but whether such screening
function is to be exercised in every case and for all types of expert
opinion testimony, or applies only to evidence with which the courts
have had little occasion to become familiar (i.e. "novel" scientific evidence) is by no means clear.
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 276. How much clearer does he require it to be?
94 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supranote 1,
at 252.
95 See id. at 310.
96 See id. at 291-92.
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adopts a notion of science common to every community of conceded
scientists, from astronomy to zoology, and denies the label to expertises or claimed expertises derived by methods that do not meet the
standards involved in this notion of science. Professor Moenssens'
attempt to claim the label "science" for enterprises that do not manifest the minimum characteristics of modem science has no benefit
except for the egos of the participants in those enterprises. Further,
his attempt not only to win the label "science" for such expertises but
also to create alternative, and virtually unfailable, "validity" criteria
for them, is a double dip, which would produce very questionable results indeed.
The very term "science" is somewhat problematic. In a general
sense, which was its main sense in the 17th century and which is still
not entirely unused, the term "science" means any organized and
analytical approach to any subject of human knowledge or interest
whatsoever. Thus we had "moral science" and still have "political science," "military science," and "library science." In its central modern
meaning, however, the term "science" is reserved for what would
have been called in earlier times "natural philosophy" and later
"natural science." Daubertused the term "science" in the latter sense,
as Moenssens is well aware.
Science in this sense is not a quality, but an enterprise with a restricted subject matter and a distinctive community methodology.
The enterprise of science deals with the generation of a certain kind
of human knowledge in a certain way. The kind of knowledge that
comprises the realm and object of scientific inquiry is knowledge
about the universe accessible to the senses. The way the enterprise of
science generates knowledge about the world accessible to the senses,
the typical structures of knowledge that this enterprise yields, and the
principles by which such knowledge is taken to be validated, are,
perhaps somewhat surprisingly, not completely worked out in a way
subject to total agreement either among its practitioners or among
those who make the examination of the enterprise their own subject
of inquiry (that is, philosophers and historians of science). Nevertheless, the general characteristics of the enterprise are fairly well understood.
Any sophisticated account9 7 of the scientific enterprise must give
due regard to the role of considering a wide range of reported sense
97 We do not claim that the short account
in the text is very sophisticated. Indeed, we have tried to avoid controversy by writing only in the most general terms
with few footnotes. Still, the main contours set out here will suffice for our purposes.

436

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29:405

observations in laying out the contours of the possible, the role of
imagination and esthetic intuition in forming hypotheses about possible worlds consistent with the data regarded, and the role of skeptical formal empirical testing in attempting to falsify the imagined
world of the hypothesis. Sense observation of the physical world,
perhaps aided by sense-enhancing instruments developed for the
purpose, is the foundation of science, but of course disorganized reports of more or less random sense observations do not form part of
the process of science. Science requires standardization of the conditions of such reports, and a formal analytical system for their organization. A central condition that must be present is theoretical reproducibility of observation (two observers in the same position could
perceive the same thing), with strong favor given to reports of observations that can be practically repeated by multiple observers, with
stronger favor given to reports that reflect dimensions of an event
that can be measured, and even stronger favor given to dimensions
that can be measured quantitatively with some precision."8 These reports must then be organizable, and in fact be organized, according
to some analytic system of similarities and differences that generates
hierarchies of categories. In short, the enterprise of science requires
an explicit formal and generally well worked out taxonomy.
These taxonomic conditions for the collection and organization
of observations are necessary conditions for the enterprise of science,
but not sufficient in and of themselves to comprise a science. This is
not to say that the descriptive organization of observations is not
valuable in itself. Whole branches of human knowledge, including
much of history and philosophy, are primarily of this sort. The taxonomic enterprise is not unscientific, but it does not by itself make a
science. Science must go beyond descriptive taxonomy of even the
most quantified sort to the enterprise of hypothesis and theory creation.
A scientific hypothesis is a statement about inter-relationships
between items or categories that is formulated in such a way that it
can be subjected to empirical testing. A theory is a set of intercon-

98

We mean to take no position on controversies concerning the point at which

apparent precision becomes misleading illusion or the proper role for ways of dealing with various forms of indeterminacy (such as Bayesian probability theory, or the
mathematics of fuzzy sets) in any aspect of the scientific enterprise, including taxonomy, hypothesis formation, and theory building. Even in the face of various indices
of indeterminacy, whether conceived of as inevitable or not, testability and the requirement of testing remain constants in all approaches.
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nected hypotheses of varying generality which account for a wide
range of phenomena.9
A hypothesis that cannot be subjected to empirical testing is a
metaphysical proposition that is by definition not part of science. A
hypothesis that is potentially subject to testing but has never been
tested is unproven, and cannot be treated as a source of dependable
scientific knowledge. A hypothesis that has been subjected to substantial empirical testing and has not been falsified may properly be
treated as validated, although all empirical testing is essentially a
probabilistic enterprise. Thus, no hypothesis is ever subject to absolute verification, but the nature of both the data and the fit of the
hypothesis with other more or less validated' °° principles may push
the probability of the truth of the hypothesis so high that it would be
crazy to spend much time worrying about the residual probability of
falsity for any practical purpose. Such relations may come to be referred to as scientific "laws."
The third major aspect of the scientific enterprise is real-world
empirical testing of the truth of the relationships asserted by hypotheses, and the theories that both derive from and generate hypotheses. Like the taxonomic aspect, the empirical testing aspect involves careful observations of phenomena through the senses.
However, empirical testing is focused on the observations capable of
testing (falsifying) a hypothesis, whereas taxonomically important observations may be made in a much less directed way. The empirical
testing enterprise contains a whole constellation of special problems
revolving around how to determine what observations and conditions
of observation are in fact consistent or inconsistent with a hypothesis,
with one of the chief concerns being to structure conditions in such a
way so as to avoid what are globally called "artifacts," especially
"expectancy effects," one of the most serious dangers dogging the

"Facts are the world's data. Theories are structures of ideas that explain and
interpret facts." Stephen Jay Gould (1983), quoted in ISAAC ASIMOV & JASON A.
SCHULMAN, ISAAC ASIMOV'S BOOK OF SCIENCE AND NATURE QUOTATIONS 100 (1988).
Some courts mistakenly assume that science deals only with second and third order
abstractions, properly labeled theories, which are directed at explaining the cosmos,
or at least "the world," and not with more concrete and everyday phenomena. This
was the fundamental error of the court in United States v. Jones, which appears to have
concluded that handwriting experts are not and could never be doing science: "We
are quite convinced that handwriting examiners do not concentrate on 'proposing
and refining theoretical explanations about the world."' United States v.Jones, 107
F.3d 1147, 1157 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)).
See infra note 103 (on the tension between validation and falsification).
9
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quest for scientific knowledge.'O In many areas of science, empirical
testing must not only meet such criteria, but new instruments must
be developed that will make such observations possible.
The taxonomic, the hypothesis making/theory generation, and
the empirical testing aspects are not totally separate enterprises, of
course, and every practicing scientist will have familiarity with each
process, at least within the confines of his or her area of interest.
Each process feeds on the other, with taxonomic systems providing
material that theories must take into account, theories providing
predictions (hypotheses) to which testing must be directed, and testing observations providing new data, which must be absorbed into
taxonomies. It is interesting to note that individual practitioners
within the enterprise of science may show marked predilections for
one function or another. People whose strength is hypothesis generation/theory building may, for reasons of esthetics or ego, display
quite "unscientific" commitment to the validity of their hypotheses in
advance of testing (which may sometimes bear them out and sometimes shatter them).
In fact, it may even be that such an
"unscientific" emotional commitment is necessary to drive some such
people through the act of creative imagination necessary for the hypothesis generation. At the other extreme, people whose careers are
devoted primarily to testing other people's hypotheses can come to
be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as unimaginative skeptics driven by a
vision of themselves as the reality police of the enterprise of science.
Finally, taxonomists tend to be (unfairly) regarded by all sides as, to
borrow the phrase of Samuel Johnson describing lexicographers,
"harmless drudges." 02 Uncommonly, a single individual may combine substantial talents in all areas. For example, Darwin was a firstclass primary observer and taxonomist as well as theoretician, who
was quite sensitive to the need for testing. Others may not. Einstein
made few primary observations and was not particularly interested in
the dirty details of confirmatory (or disconfirmatory)' °s testing
101 See generally ROBERT ROSENTHAL, EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORAL RE-

(1976). Accordingly, real science aims to structure its procedures in ways
that will maximize the contribution of evidence and minimize the contribution of
bias to data gathering and inference drawing. For example, consider the widespread use of double-blind research designs.
:02 SAMUELJOHNSON, DICTIONARYOF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785).
103 Here we must address the main technical conflict between Karl Popper and
SEARCH

his critics, which results from Popper's attempt to solve the Problem of Induction.
See COLIN HOWSON & PETER URBACH, SCIENTIFIC REASONING:

THE BAYESIAN APPROACH

ch.1 (1989). Popper's claim is that one can disprove a hypothesis in a way significantly different than one can prove it. Basically, as a matter of logic, ignoring second order problems of knowledge, a series of confirming instances, no matter how
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(though he of course recognized the necessity for it). Nevertheless,
for an enterprise and its products to qualify as a science, its group
practice must manifest all three functions in a balanced, ongoing,
and dynamic way, even if its individual practitioners do not always do
SO.
It is probably not very controversial to say that, within the realm
of factual inquiry, the properly tested products of the enterprise of
science, where relevant, are the most dependable sources of factual
information available to human beings. This does not mean, however, first, that valid science-generated information will always be
available on the fact issues the law cares about or, second, that other
non-science sources of fact information are not dependable enough
for the practical purposes of the law in many contexts. However, the
special preeminence of science in the realm of fact more or less dictates that anything being labeled science in the courtroom ought to
meet the validity criteria of proper science. Exegesis of particular
language aside, this we take to be a central precept of Daubert.
Professor Moenssens objects to the general application of these
criteria, and raises what he implies is a parade of horribles that would
flow from such a standard, including the exclusion of many "soft science" subject matters such as psychological syndrome evidence, etc.
(of which, he claims, handwriting identification is one).0 4
There are numerous problems with Moenssens' position. First,
most of the things he includes as "soft science," such as the conclusions of forensic pathologists and various examples of psychological
"syndrome" evidence, are clearly "part of science" in the general
sense of being the products of practitioners who claim to be applying
scientific knowledge developed elsewhere in the general enterprise,
long, does not establish a proposition, because the next instance encountered may
be the contradictory instance that falsifies the proposition, whereas one falsifying
instance falsifies. This is the basis for Popper's emphasis on falsifiability. However,
in the real world, one cannot ignore second order problems of knowledge. Our
knowledge of the reality of disconfirming instances is as probabilistic and subject to
error as our knowledge of confirming instances, which undermines the logical difference between confirmation and falsification and reduces both to probabilistic enterprises. Whether or not this insight totally destroys the special place of falsification
is a topic of debate, a debate which was unlikely to have been well understood by the
Supreme Court when it invoked Popper and which does not make any practical difference in real world applications. Even committed Popperians will operationally
treat propositions as "confirmed" when the series of uncontradicted confirmatory
instances gets so high that worrying about the remote probability of falsification
seems a waste of time. As Moenssens does not seem to understand, none of the debates surrounding Popper's approach have much, if anything, to do with the issues
concerning expert testimony addressed in Daubert. See Moenssens, Post-Daubert
World, supra note 1, at 286-87
104 See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 294.
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or who claim to have developed such knowledge themselves. These
experts are, in short, practitioners who are part of an ongoing scientific enterprise. That many of them, or perhaps most in some areas
listed by Moenssens, have confused hypothesis with fact, 05 merely illustrates the usual operation by which the group makes progress even
though many credentialed members of the group may in the interim
act "unscientifically." This phenomenon certainly does not justify
creating a new category for such experts, much less applying any relaxed standards of validity to them. If such practitioners are not allowed to testify because they fail the minimum validity criteria proper
to a scientific enterprise, that is not necessarily a bad thing. And if
we allow them to testify in those circumstances, perhaps we had better work out a better account of what we are about when we do so.
Certainly, allowing practitioners unable to meet minimum validity
criteria to give testimony assertedly relevant to actus reus or to identity issues'06 in criminal cases is among the least justifiable thing we
can do if we mean what we say about the presumption of innocence
and the principle of rational fact finding. 17
105

It is curious to us that Professor Moenssens can celebrate his own justified

skepticism toward such things as earmark identification, see Moenssens, Post-Daubert
World, supra note 1, at 293-94, and aspects of syndrome, footmark, and bitemark
identification, id. at 292 & n.109, in an article which displays such an unquestioning
commitment to all applications of Osbornian handwriting identification in spite of
the weakness of the evidence concerning it. In this regard, it is instructive to compare his attitude toward handwriting identification with the positions he has previously expressed toward another asserted identification-by-comparison technique,
voiceprints. In 1984, after reviewing the literature on voiceprints (which presumably
he considered himself qualified to do), he concluded that voice spectrography
"produces results based on an unproven assumption." Moenssens, Admissibility, supra note 92, at 557. Moenssens further noted that:
The theory of voice uniqueness, however, which the scientific community should have subjected to a searching stage-two inquiry, never has
been proven by empirical evidence. As long as the theory remains a
postulate, and not a proven fact, the technique of comparing voice
spectrograms cannot establish the identity of a speaker with any relative degree of certainty. Upon what basis then could a court find that
voiceprint identification had been generally accepted?
Id.
106 On the special place of such issues in the establishment
of truly factual and
non-normative innocence, see generally D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore,
Johnny Lynn Old Chief and "LegitimateMoral Force:" Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstring and Gore, 49 HAsTINGs L.J. (forthcoming 1999).
10
Moenssens himself would agree with the need for reliability of expert methodology:
A conservative test - one that will not permit the prosecution or the
defense to use evidence based on tests of unproven reliability - is especially commendable in criminal cases, in which the technical inquiry
is directed toward resolving the ultimate issue of guilt. When scientific
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However, handwriting identification (the main focus of PostDaubert World) doesn't even make it into the category of "science" in
any tenable modern sense.' 8 No members of the handwriting identification community are rewarded for doing empirical testing and for
examining the claims of the enterprise skeptically. To apply the label
"science" to the enterprise in general or to the practice of individual
practitioners in particular would deprive the term of any defensible
meaning.'.. Note that this does not mean that, a priori, it should be
tests purport to identify the defendant as the guilty party, courts must
screen out those techniques that do not invariably point to the guilty
party. Otherwise, the jury might be deceived.
Moenssens, Admissibility, supra note 92, at 546 (footnotes omitted). Moenssens further noted that:
In criminal cases, where an individual's freedom is at stake, courts certainly ought to be very cautious in admitting evidence based upon insufficiently tested or verified premises, especially when the evidence seeks
to establish the ultimate issue in the case - the identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the offense.
ANDRE A. MOENSSENS, JAMES E. STARRS, CAROL E. HENDERSON, & FRED E. INBAU,
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 18 (4th ed. 1995).

108 Compare the basics of the scientific method to the comments
of leading questioned document examiners on a panel discussing the controversy over the scientific
shortcomings of QDEs. Robert Muehlberger: "We are not research scientists. We
are practitioners and have a caseload." Duayne Dillon, referring to the inability of
QDE practitioners to convince others that their techniques are valid and reliable:
"Only we who do it can know that what we say about it is true." Mary Wenderoth
Kelly, referring to the skeptical comments of Risinger or Denbeaux on the same
panel discussion: "He went after our weak point: no data." Contemporaneous
notes of MichaelJ. Saks from Annual Meeting of AAFS, Nashville, Tenn, (Feb. 19-24,
1996) (on file with the Seton Hall Law Review).
10, There are three different ways that QDEs could attempt to find scientific
(as
opposed to merely rhetorical) support for their claims. These are the following:
1. The applied science model - theoretical extrapolation version. If it could
be shown that QDEs are applying principles that have been well established
(empirically tested) in basic research, that provides a basis for believing there would
be validity in the extrapolation of that basic science knowledge to QDEs' clinical
practice. For example, compare forensic chemists, who borrow the basic knowledge
of chemistry and apply it to forensic chemistry problems. (Of course, the correctness
of the application and the accuracy of the results produced still need to be examined.) But, of course, for handwriting identification there is no body of basic research knowledge from which QDEs can borrow. "If there is no science, there can be no
forensic science." John Thornton, The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identification: Substitution of Intuition or Experience for Defensible Scientific Fact, in MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 40, § 20-5.5.
2. The applied science model - statistical modeling version. The fundamental
assumptions of QDEs are similar to those of DNA typing: intense variability among a
large number of attributes. Accordingly, QDEs could undertake to do what has
been done in DNA typing: Obtain counts of frequencies of various writing attributes
in the population, and use those actually to calculate the probability of a coincidental erroneous match in the case at bar (rather than making wholly intuitive and subjective judgments). See generally Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA
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impossible for any handwriting identification expert ever to testify.
Instead, this means that handwriting identification must be treated as
a claimed non-scientific clinical skill. For such asserted but untested
expertise, from dowsing to wine tasting, what is lacking in internal
scientific validation must be supplied by external scientific validation,
treating the practitioners not as scientists but as instruments, and testing their accuracy under a variety of conditions."0 Only by requiring
such external scientific validation of clinical expertise can the law obtain what it claims it is after - information that can be rationally
helpful because there is reason to believe it dependable beyond the
self-confidence of its practitioners.
Which brings us to our final point. Even if it were defensible to
create a subset of "clinical science" for purposes of determining admissibility, and even if handwriting identification were in such a category, the criteria that Moenssens has proposed for determining admissibility are so tenuously related to validity and Daubertian
"reliability" as to be virtually no test at all. Here they are, exactly as
Moenssens set them out:

"Fingerprinting"Can Teach the Law About the Rest of ForensicScience, 13 CARDOZO L. REV.
361 (1991). While small beginnings to such a science have been attempted, it has
had no application by QDEs. See sources collected in Exorcism, supra note 2, at 739
n.31.
3. The black-box model. Taking QDEs and their practice as it has existed for
the past century or so, one still can easily bring the scientific method to bear simply
by treating the QDEs and the process of doing whatever it is they claim to be doing
as a black box, and measuring the inputs and outputs. That is, QDEs can systematically be presented with writings of known origin, and their decisions about authorship can be compared to what is known to be true of those writings. By testing different kinds of QDEs with various different kinds of stimulus writings, under
different types of testing conditions, using different methods of examination, one
could eventually map the extent of special abilities and limitations of different types
of QDEs, and of different individual QDEs, in examining different types of writing,
using different comparison methods, under different types of conditions. Moreover,
such research would provide empirical answers to many of the assertions about
QDEs, and differences among QDEs, that are sprinkled throughout Moenssens' article, with nothing but his (and the QDEs) ipse dixit for support.
110 We have made this point elsewhere. See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience,
supra note 2, at 40-41.
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SUGGESTED CRITERIA FOR TESTING "RELIABILITY"
(1) A professional literature exists in a field that describes
the accepted processes by which the aims of the field can be
reliably realized."'
(2) There exist professional societies and associations, open
to the membership of individuals whose qualifications have
been examined, that engage in continuing education, publication and research pursuits.
(3) The discipline possesses recommended courses of study
and training for becoming competent to work as a professional in the field, and access to the profession is open to all
qualified individuals.

This apparently refers to the "scientific method of comparison," which Moenssens claims justifies forensic identification independent of any attempt at being
quantified statistically in terms of error rates. See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 320. By "scientific method of comparison," therefore, Moenssens apparently means the method recommended by the field, what has been sometimes
referred to in the case of Osbornian handwriting identification as the "standard
methods," "proper methods," or simply "true methods" by its leading practitioners.
See authorities cited in Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 35 n.90. One should
understand, therefore, that there is a world of difference between "the scientific
method" as that phrase is usually used in science, and Moenssens' "scientific methods of comparison." In regard to handwriting, Moenssens actually describes the
"scientific method of comparison" as follows:
In United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d. 844, 846 n.3 (3rd Cir. 1995), the
government expert described the procedures that she and other experts in handwriting analysis employ:
(1) the expert determines
whether a questioned document contains a sufficient amount of writing and enough individual characteristics to permit identification; (2)
if the document is identifiable, the expert examines the submitted
handwriting specimens in the same manner; (3) if both contain a sufficient number of identifiable features the two documents are compared to determine whether the individual features are different or
the same; (4) the expert weighs the evidence, considering both similarities and differences in the writings examined and determines
whether or not they are by the same writer.
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 320 n.306. Here is what the
Starzecpyzel court thought of this "scientific method of comparison," as explained by a
prominent QDE expert witness, Mary Wenderoth Kelly: "[H]ow FDE's [Forensic
Document Examiners] might accomplish this [identification] was unclear to the
Court before the hearing, and largely remains so after the hearing." United States v.
Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). "Both the Defendants and
the Court sought elucidation on this issue, but met with little success." Id. Based on
Moenssens' summary, it is not hard to understand why: Document identification is
an entirely subjective process. Kam, writing on the same point, said: "It is very likely
that many examiner decisions and associations are difficult to verbalize, and that
some verbal explanations are post factum recreations of the reasoning process."
Kam I, supra note 8, at 12.
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(4) The education and training to achieve basic proficiency
in the discipline is supervised by professionals in the discipline who have gained some degree of prominence in their
field, and who can impart knowledge to students of the discipline as they are supervising the development of the students' basic skills.
(5) There exists a program of supervised practical or clinical
experience under the guidance of experts who have gained
some degree of recognition in the discipline.
(6) A person offering to testify as an "expert" in the discipline has demonstrated the aptitude and proficiency expected of working professionals in the field by an examination board, a sponsoring professional association, or by
completing other credentialing procedures.
(7) There exists the ability to retest the same evidential materials by an expert for the opposing side, or for the participation of such an expert in testing that is destructive in nature."'
Moenssens then states that this list is "neither essential nor exclusive," but that it will "screen13 out the type of 'forensic' expert opinion that is truly 'unreliable.'1
Even were these criteria absolutely required, however, there is
nothing in them that will screen out the "unreliable." Meeting these
criteria merely establishes the existence of a self-believing guild with
a modicum of organizational skill. It might surprise Professor
Moenssens to realize that by his "test" many of the "graphologists"
would be able to testify, since their guild structure mirrors that of his
favorite group, the American Society of Questioned Document Examiners (ASQDE), or can be easily modified to do so. 4 Indeed, his
"test" seems to have been generated by asking "what criteria can the
ASQDE members satisfy," and backing the list out from there. Note
that there is no requirement in Moenssens' criteria of true profi112

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supranote 1, at 291-92.

,,3Id. at 292.

The facts underlying this assertion are provided by Moenssens himself. Indeed, one of his complaints is that graphologist groups have tried to mirror the
114

ASQDE. See Moenssens, Post-DaubertWorld, supra note 1, at 269-70. There seems to

be little reason why the Independent Association of Q, stioned Document Examiners or the Association of Questioned Document Examiners, described by Moenssens
in his appendix, could not satisfy all of Moenssens' listed criteria with minor adjustments to their practices and by-laws. At least one of the two organizations publishes
a journal, the Journalof Questioned Document Examination, which is older than the Osbornian InternationalJournal of Forensic Document Examiners, which only began publication in 1995.
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ciency testing, only a requirement that proficiency in doctrine and
accepted procedure be demonstrated to a board of "true believers,"
independent of validity."5 The weaknesses of The American Board of
Forensic Document Examiners certification testing procedure are
well documented " ' and show the weakness of Moenssens' criteria as
drafted. Moreover, one might think that the requirement that some
members of the enterprise be engaged in "educational and publishing pursuits" under criterion 2 might provide some scientific context,
until one recalls what weak anecdotal material Moenssens is willing to
count as "research." In short, Moenssens' criteria are nothing more
than a version of the Frye test unhooked from any standards of science, combined with the most narrow and formalistic notion of what
constitutes a proper community of acceptance.' 7 They go counter to
the direction of both the Supreme Court and the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence in seeking true reliability
criteria for
' 8
"science."
of
realm
the
beyond
contexts
in
application
"5

Elsewhere, Moenssens has written that "[mlost of the witnesses who testify as

experts for the prosecution are not truly scientists, but better fit the label
'technicians' ..... Andre A. Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal
Cases: Some Words of Caution, 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5 (1993) [hereinafter
Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence]. Such technicians "are not however the kind of
experts that lawyers need in an attempt to make new law by being among the first to
introduce novel expert testimony in court." Id. Need we add that this applied
equally to old but unvalidated principles and techniques. If one takes Moenssens'
criteria at face value, restrictive organizations of astrologers could readily be created
that would qualify their members to testify.
As we pointed out in Science and Nonscience.
[Tihe certification testing program of... the American Board of
Forensic Document Examiners... described by Mary Wenderoth Kelly
(a member of that certifying board) in her Starzecpyzel testimony, leaves
a lot to be desired. While there is a short multiple choice test to
measure knowledge of handwriting identification doctrine, the heart
of the examination is based on the administration of five of only seven
or eight test problems, only two or three of which involve handwriting
identification. The same problems are used year after year on an
honor system where they are sent to the candidates for certification
through their teaching mentor, and left with them for a month unsupervised before the answers are returned.
Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 38 n.94.
1
See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1209-11 (1980) (discussing,
among various shortcomings of the Frye test, the fact that the more narrowly one defines the expert community the more general acceptance will appear to exist, and
the more broadly one defines the community the less consensus will appear).
118 The proposed amendment to FED. R. EVID. 702, drafted by the Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence to the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
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Finally, Moenssens' criteria are focused on the seeming legitimacy of groups of people, not on the validity of components of their
knowledge or techniques. Thus, surgeons would surely pass Moenssens' test, and all of their favorite surgical techniques would be
"recognized" and "respected" (to use his terms). But, as we previously noted,"' a review of systematic empirical research on many of
the most commonly employed surgical procedures discovered that
only about one-third of them worked as well as believed, another
third were ineffective, and the final third actually did more harm
than good. Surgeons realize that systematic empirical testing is their
best guide to what works and what does not, not the sorts of factors
upon which Moenssens would have the courts rely. Thanks to their
empirical research, surgeons can continually improve the quality of
their work and over time shed their errors.
Perhaps the worst effect of Moenssens' proposal, but the effect
that he apparently most hopes for, is that pesky skeptics who are not
guild members would be barred from testifying about potential
weaknesses in the expertise. On this point, as on other points in his
article, Moenssens is not entirely consistent, since he is willing to
celebrate non-guild members like Kam in whose work he can find
support.1

20

But it is clear that when it comes to evaluating the de-

pendability of handwriting identification, Moenssens finds consistency to be an inconvenient hobgoblin of small minds.'2 Perhaps the
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, provided that (1) the testimony is sufficiently based upon reliable facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.
PRELIMINARY DRAFr OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE (August 1998) (circulated for comments). This amend-

ment appears designed to move the courts further along the path of validity and
clarity that the Supreme Court blazed in Daubert, and further away from the looseness recommended by Moenssens.
:9
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Moenssens has some very slippery definitions of what QDE science is and who
can do it. He says that QDEs are not scientists but technicians and as such cannot be
expected to do empirical research, to know the literature, or to be able to talk about
it in court - tasks to be done by those who know about empirical research. But
when we undertook that evaluation (by looking at the empirical research literature,
or lack thereof), he says that people like us are not qualified to do it, because we are
not trained QDEs (though he makes a special exception for Kam). What is one to
make of this? Moenssens seems to be saying: You can't ask QDEs to justify themselves. And non-QDEs cannot inquire into the empirical basis of QDEs' claims, except when they produce studies that appear to be supportive.
Consider the positions taken in Post-Daubert World with Moenssens'
many pre-
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current fever will subside and he will return to the more defensible
positions of his past. We can only wish him a speedy recovery.
PART II

Introduction
At various points in Professor Moenssens article we are told the
following about ourselves and our work: We are "self styled evidentiary law reformers,012 "legal activists"'23 who have descended "from
the perch of academic inquiry into partisan advocacy"; 12 4 our work
"lack[s] intrinsic worth,' 2 5 "suffer[s] from serious research deficiencies," 2 6 is "highly
questionable research,' 7 is marked by
"superficiality,"2 8 and is "highly deficient in scholarship and based
upon an ignorance of the underlying factual basis."'29 Our "poor
scholarship"'30 is properly characterized as "junk scholarship,"' 3'
"inadequately researched from a technical as well as a legal standpoint"; 32 we failed in our research,"33 and "the author's serious deficiency in legal research" 34 reflects "innumerable errors '" 5 using
"inaccurate, inappropriate, out-of-date citations" 36 and "citing
authorities for propositions which they do not support. '13 Moenssens claims that our writing has "distortions, omissions and many
other shortcomings"'-" and "many inaccuracies and slanted statements,"'3" is "poorly documented"'1' 4 and in general is "a lot of acavious positions noted throughout this article, particularly supra notes 35, 92, 105,
and 107, and infra notes 147 and 283. Sometimes internal inconsistencies appear in
Post-Daubert World itself. See supra notes 35, 105, and 114 and infra notes 164, 236,
and 239.
12
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 266.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 274.
15 Id. at 256.
126 Id.
17 Id. at 307.
128 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supranote 1, at 254 n.7.
1
Id. at 299.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 330 n.348.
132 Id. at 311.
133 Id. at 302
n.224.
134 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 304.
135 Id.
I% Id.
17
'3
9

Id.
Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 306.
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demic hogwash, ''... "a pseudo-study'' 42 "ignoring, denying or suppressing inconvenient evidence";'43 we are "appallingly ill-informed
and misinformed"1 44 and our conclusions are "unwarranted, untenable and erroneous.,,145
Needless to say, we do not agree with these characterizations,
and we will deal with the asserted bases for them (to the extent there
are any) at some length in this Part. However, we think it necessary
to put the rhetorical excesses of Professor Moenssens' article on the
table at the outset, if for no other reason than to give the reader unfamiliar with the piece some exposure to its peculiar viciousness. In
Part I we characterized Professor Moenssens' failure to follow the
more judicious principles of his previous writings as a fever, but in
fact it appears to be more in the nature of a fit. One has to wonder at
the forces that have precipitated all this vitriol. Indeed, we have a few
hunches.
It seems that we have inadvertently gored a whole herd of Professor Moenssens' oxen. Professor Moenssens entered the forensic
science field in the early 1950s in his native Belgium under the tutelage of "the late Major (ret.) Georges H. Defawe."046 He thus apparently started as one of those "technicians" (his word) 147 who were basically individuals trained in some forensic technique without
substantial formal science background. Such technicians constituted
the vast bulk of forensic science professionals until quite recently. In
addition, Major Defawe was an Osbornian document examiner, and
Moenssens himself was trained as a questioned document examiner
(QDE) for two years before deciding to specialize in fingerprint identification.14 8 He has maintained strong ties to the orthodox QDE
community through the years, and was incorporator of the ASQDE
when it became a non-profit corporation in 1972.' 49 In 1997 he was
given a special award by the Document Section of the American
Academy of Forensic Sciences.150
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 310.
Id. at 309 n.260.
142 Id. at 311.
143 Id. at 309.
144
Id. at 330.
145
Id. at 330 n.347.
146
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 308 n.253.
147 "Most of the witnesses who testify as experts for the prosecution
are not truly
scientists, but better fit the label 'technicians."' Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence,
supra note 115, at 5.
,48 See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 253.
149 See id. at 258 n.22.
150 The award was presented to him
by Robert J. Meuhlberg, one of the QDEs
140

141
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In addition to his emotional ties to the QDE community,
Moenssens obtained an LL.M. from Northwestern Law School in
1967, where he came under the personal mentorship of Fred Inbau,
who in turn was a prottg6 ofJohn Henry Wigmore. The almost filial
relationship of Inbau to Wigmore and Moenssens to Inbau"' appears
to have provided another strong impetus driving Moenssens' rhetoric
while clouding his judgment. Indeed, it almost seems that our worst
sin, in Moenssens' view, is a kind of lese majeste, an insufficient manifestation of reverence for Wigmore, Inbau, Albert Osborn, and the
average (Osbornian) toiler in the field of document examination.
The single most extreme example of our irreverence, in Moenssens' eyes, seems to be our passing characterization of Wigmore as
the "800 pound gorilla of American Evidence law."'5'2 Since Moenssens repeats this phrase with undisguised horror three different times
in his article,' 5 let us make one thing clear immediately: We do not
view this characterization as "derogatory" or even disrespectful
(though it is concededly lacking in reverence). Each of us would be
gleeful to know that someone would refer to us as the 800 pound gorilla of anything fifty years after our death. The point of invoking this
old joke was to emphasize that with position and authority, however
well earned, comes the power to throw one's weight around unreflectively and perhaps the temptation to do so, which is not always resisted. We believe Wigmore did this from time to time, and that his
uncritical support of Albert Osborn's principles of handwriting identification was one of those times. Wigmore was a giant figure of
American jurisprudence, no doubt about it, but he was in many ways
a complicated and at times difficult character. We do not believe that
anyone can read what we actually wrote about Wigmore without concluding that we attempted to recognize both his strengths (such as
his extreme general intelligence, his breadth of interests, and his gi-

Moenssens credits in his prefatory footnote and then an officer of the Questioned
Documents sections of both the AAFS and the ASQDE. The award speaks of Moenssens' "unwavering support of the questioned document community." Contemporaneous notes of Michael J. Saks from annual meeting of AAFS, New York, N.Y. (Feb.
17-22, 1997) (on file with author).

151 Inbau went to Northwestern Law School for an
LL.M. after graduating from
Tulane Law School. After receiving his LL.M. in 1933, he was hired by Wigmore to
work at the Northwestern University Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, and
later joined the Northwestern faculty in 1936. See AALS DiRECTORY OF LAw
TEACHERS, (1995-96).
Moenssens became Inbau's co-author very soon after his
graduation from Northwestern in 1967.
:52 Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 768.
55 See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1,at 300 n.222, 302 nn.226 &
229.
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gantic capacity for work) ,"' and his weaknesses (such as his uncritical

devotion to "scientism").'55 This approach apparently strikes Moenssens as inappropriately irreverent.
Similar observations could be made in regard to our treatment
of Albert Osborn, who, according to Moenssens, was the author of a
"pioneering treatise, a work that still stands revered, 56 and a
"disparaged and maligned [by us, presumably] giant of scientific
document examination.' 57 Osborn was, as we said, clearly an ambitious man of exceptional intelligence. In Exorcism, we tried to give a
feel for how such a man of his time and place could become personally committed to the unverified theories he put forth and promoted.
Perhaps the harshest words we used to characterize him were "vanity"
and "arrogance,"'5 8 but we do not think one can read his voluminous
works, or transcripts of his testimony in the Hauptmann trial, without
being reminded of the old saw, "I may have been in error, but I've
never been in doubt." Again, this5seems to lack the level of reverence
Moenssens thinks is appropriate.

We have already dealt with Moenssens' misplaced defensiveness
as to the Inbau study and our treatment of it in Part I, and need not
repeat ourselves here, except to make two points. First, Moenssens
falsely suggests, when giving examples of our "sarcasm," that we disrespected Inbau by referring to "'prisoners,' 'second graders,' and
'calligraphers"" 6 when discussing his study. Second, Moenssens suggests that we were inappropriately harsh when we wrote of Inbau's
study, "[W] hat we might infer of the conditions of test administration
61
from some of Inbau's description is hardly encouraging.'

See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 767-68.
See id. at 768-69.
156 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World,
supra note 1, at 257 n.17.
157 Id. at 302 n.224.
:58 See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 766.
59 Moenssens also criticizes us as "demeaning and depreciating" on page 302
and
in note 228 for saying that in 1876, "Osborn's mastery of penmanship offered a path
off the farm." Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 302 n.228. But this is
indubitably true, and hardly disrespectful. As was explained at length in Exorcism,
:54

55

drawing from Clark Sellers's laudatory biographical sketch, Osborn had dropped out
of college and returned to his father's farm where he lived until he got ajob teach-

ing penmanship at a business college in Rochester. See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra
note 2, at 764-65 (citing Clark Sellers, Albert Sherman Osborn: Questioned Document
Pioneer, 45 A.B.A. J. 1285 (1959)). Leaving the farm thus is an honored tradition.

One of our own fathers sought and.found a path off the farm in an analogous way,
as have the forebears of millions of Americans.
160
161

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 302 n.226.
Id.
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As to the first point, the words given had nothing to do with the
Inbau study specifically. Here is what we wrote regarding test design
in general (the passage from which the "sarcastic" words were
drawn):
Identifying handwriting from stylistic similarities perceived byjuxtaposing authentic exemplars with questioned documents presents many of the same problems as eyewitness identification.
Some circumstances are so clear that mistakes are unlikely on
anyone's part. If one of five prisonersmust have written a threatening note slid out of a jail cell, four of them have to that point
printed like second graders every halting document they have ever
been know to produce, the fifth is a professional calligrapher,and

the note is in flowing calligraphy, then identifying the writer
would be easy for anyone. On the other
hand, some identifica6
tion tasks may be beyond anyone's skill.1 1
We may at times have been sarcastic, but the above example was
clearly not one of those times.
As for the second challenged passage, we do not know how we
could have more gently introduced the point, fully documented with
quotes from Inbau's own report, that Inbau had shared his test materials and the correct answers with colleagues, who could have, and in
at least one instance did (we will assume inadvertently, as Inbau says)
destroy the test by sharing this information in advance of the tests
with people who turned out to be test subjects. So much for Moenssens' sensitive protectiveness toward Inbau. Filial defensiveness is
understandable, and perhaps even admirable in some contexts, but it
does not make for balanced scholarly evaluation.
As to our attitudes toward the average document examiner, we
have a great amount of sympathy for them. They have invested heavily in the reality of what they do, and questions about its limits are
understandably threatening and painful. However, we also have
sympathy for those whose fates turn on their testimony to one degree
or another. Moenssens characterizes our "tone" as having been
"sarcastic," "scornful," and "demeaning and depreciating."'" 3 We believe he is displaying undue sensitivity. We wrote to drive our points
home effectively in the face of an established order and received wisdom. If we made the keepers of that order and received wisdom uncomfortable, that was an unfortunate side effect of a necessary process.

et. al.,
Exorcism, supra note 2, at 742 (emphasis added).
63 Risinger
Moenssens,
Post-Daubert
World, supra note 1, at 302.
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Whatever may explain the intensity of the Moenssens rhetoric,
the form of his article is yet another puzzle, and one that complicates
the framing of this response. First, it is long (80 pages). Second, it is
oddly fashioned, with many internal contradictions, repetitions, and
infelicities.'6 The article gives the appearance to us of a pastiche,
something constructed from many sources and stitched together in a
not-fully-integrated way. More than anything else, Moenssens' article
seems to be a collection of quotable "sound-bites" that may not fit together very coherently, but that can be dropped into briefs as quotes
to provide the appearance of academic authority in response to any
in-court attack on the dependability of handwriting identification expertise. The structure of Moenssens' article means that, in fashioning a response, one cannot merely rely on answering large points,
but must take on particulars virtually paragraph by paragraph, lest
the failure to respond be unfairly cited in the future as a concession
of the validity of some isolated paragraph or other.'6 It seems clear
that the intended audience of Moenssens' piece is not the academic
community, whose members will generally read the piece in full if it
bears on their work, and thus be in a position to evaluate its worth,
but the judiciary, whose members (unfortunately but predictably)
will not.
With this in mind, Part II will proceed as follows. Section A will
deal globally with three of Moenssens' general attacks, because these
attacks demand a global response. In section B we will then make
our way tediously through Moenssens' article, responding in detail as
we go. It is expected that Part II will serve more as a resource than as
a source of pleasure reading, though there may be nuggets of
amusement concealed therein to reward the casual reader.

16
Many specific inconsistencies and infelicities are dealt with infra. For now,
consider the following statements, which occur within two paragraphs of each other:
"the task of comparing handwritings constitutes but a small part of the varied workload of questioned document examiners." Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra
note 1, at 258. "Clearly, however, handwriting examinations occupy the major portion of many questioned document examiners' workloads." Id. at 259. Or contrast
the assertion that "the progression of knowledge in handwriting examination has
been phenomenal during the past twenty years" on pages 317-18, with the listing of
the leading treatises in the field provided in notes 15 and 21, which bear the publication dates 1926, 1929, 1956, 1964, 1966, and 1982.
165 We here declare that we are not confident that we have addressed
every detail
raised in Moenssens' article, and do not intend accidental silence to be any admission whatsoever.
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Bias, Money, and Lack of Qualifications

Moenssens seems to claim that the Exorcism article can be viewed
as part of a scheme on our part to make money by becoming expert
witnesses even though we possess no expertise, and that even if our
motivation might have been sincere in 1988, our interest in continuing to make money prevents us from seeing the light shed by subsequent research. He further claims that we have concealed our true
motives and biases in our academic writings. Moenssens hammers
away at these themes throughout the article, often supporting them
with supposedly factual assertions that are, as we shall see, just plain
wrong.
Once again, responding is made difficult by the somewhat unstructured and elusive nature of Moenssens' attack. To demonstrate
this for the benefit of the reader unfamiliar with the Moenssens article, we have collected his assertions on these themes, and so as not to
burden the main text with too much repetition, we have set them out
in the extensive footnote below."* Our response follows. We believe
Moenssens starts the theme of bias/money/lack of qualifications in the introduction to his article by saying:
Since the publication of Exorcism, some of these authors have also become advocates and "expert witnesses" on the inexactness of handwriting identification. Portions of their testimony in several trial courts
will be quoted herein, since the authors' answers on cross-examination
provide us with a certain degree of "peer review" which was lacking at
the time of the publication of their 1989 article. None of the authors
has received training or acquired experience in handwriting identification techniques; they limited their inquiries to study of some of the
handwriting identification literature. Their only "qualifications" to testify as "experts" on handwriting identification rest on the literature
study and writing the 1989 article. In their more recent writing, the
authors fail to reveal their bias to act as advocates in criminal litigation
and oppose government document experts .... While no court has,
as yet, excluded the testimony of qualified handwriting experts... a
few courts have, on the strength of the law professor-authors' testimony as expert witnesses, at least accepted their argument that handwriting identification is non-scientific.
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 254-55 (footnotes omitted). Footnote 7 goes on:
The two articles (and the book chapter) present some valid criticisms
and make some worthwhile suggestions for improvement, while at the
same time acceptance of their constructive criticism has become more
difficult in light of the partisan positions in litigation taken by the
authors in what appears to be a full-scale attack (misdirected in the
opinion of this author) against most of the traditional crime laboratory
expert functions.
Footnote 11 expands on the claim that Professors Saks and Denbeaux lack qualifications to testify in opposition to assertions of validity by questioned document examiners and expresses obvious displeasure that "'Professor Denbeaux was still testifying,
166
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attacking the reliability of handwriting identification evidence in trials as late as
June, 1997 .... .' In footnote 36, Moenssens renews his assertions that Denbeaux
should not be found qualified to testify concerning handwriting identification reliability, quotingJames Starrs as saying that Denbeaux is "a lawyer who was out moonlighting as a document examiner with an honesty chip on his shoulder. His qualifications for his task as an expert were just a shade above that [sic] of a well read
person." Id. at 263 n.36 (quoting James E. Starrs, Recent Developments in Federal and
State Rules Pertainingto Medical and Scientific Expert Testimony, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 813, 830
(1996)). In footnote 43, Moenssens refers to Denbeaux as "the testifying law professor," while charging that his testimony in a case did not display an understanding of
the differences between various schools of handwriting identification. That note is
curiously repeated virtually verbatim as part of footnote 87. On page 274, Moenssens claims that the public silence of QDEs regarding Exorcism was a tactic that was a
miscalculation "in light of the article's authors' move from the perch of academic
inquiry into partisan advocacy." Footnote 111, and accompanying text, claims that
"some" of the authors of Exorcism have asserted in expert testimony that only testimony that can be shown to be reliable by reference to calculated error rates and statistics should be admitted. Footnote 216 refers to the Starzecpyzel and Velasquez cases
as cases "in which one or more of the Exorcism authors testified or sought to testify as
expert witnesses against the admissibility of the handwriting experts' testimony." On
page 305 Moenssens writes that the "debate about Daubert's meaning in the context
of 'scientific evidence' and 'forensic science' also offered the Exorcism authors an
opportunity to descend from the Mount Olympus of academic anonymity into the
public battle of the courtroom to advance their idea that handwriting identification
was non-scientific .. " Footnote 235 says:
At least one of the Exorcism authors, Mark P. Denbeaux, had according
to his resume introduced in evidence on the occasion of his appearance
as an 'expert witness' previous courtroom experience as a legal aid and
pro-bono advocate for criminal defendants. Indeed, the genesis of the
Exorcism article seems to have been a brief in the Mayflower Madam case,
People v. Barrows, which Professor Denbeaux tried with research performed by Exorcism co-author Dr. Saks.
Footnote 237 is yet another extended but repetitive attack on the "authors" expert
qualifications, as shown by "transcripts of Professor Denbeaux's testimony in several
trials." Footnote 238 asserts that "despite their often professed public statements
that their expertise extended only to the 'non-scientific nature' of handwriting comparisons, and that they did not profess to be handwriting examiners, one of the Exorcism co-authors (Professor Mark Denbeaux) testified to the invalidity of a specific
identification." Footnote 248 states:
The "Osbornians" among the questioned document examiners, under
attack for what they perceive to be unjust and unfair criticism of their
profession since the 1989 Exorcism article, have mounted a counterattack against Risinger and his co-authors after the professors left the
lofty spires of academe to descend into the pit of courtroom battle.
Having become litigation antagonists, testifying as expert witnesses on
the non-scientific nature of handwriting identification testimony for
the defense in criminal cases against state and federal crime lab experts who take a differing view, it is only natural for Risinger and his
co-authors to use any means to buttress the positions they take in litigation and direct their own ire at the "orthodox Osbornians" while giving
credit to the graphoanalysts.
On page 308 Moenssens writes:
What is particularly disturbing is that in the 1997 law review article,
they also fail to reveal the clear bias they have shown by offering their
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services as expert witnesses "to attack handwriting identification"
[quotes in original without further reference] any place in the country
where their services are in demand. The intentional concealment of
such bias for the sake of creating the appearance of scholarly equanimity and objectivity is indeed a serious defect that is antithetical to
credible scholarship.
Footnote 251 continues:
Thus, they fail to reveal in Science and Nonscience... that they were the
experts who appeared or sought to appear as experts in the Starzecpyzel,
Velasquez and Ruth cases... even though they cite the holdings in the
cases with professorial approval. They also fail to mention that former
co-author Mark P. Denbeaux, a colleague listed as being on the same
faculty as Professor Risinger, continues to this day on the "haveexpertise-will-travel" circuit-for-pay in criminal cases on behalf of defendants. He charges $250 per hour for his services in attacking the
reliability of handwriting identification, or at least $3000 in one particular case.
On page 309 Moenssens writes "[t] he authors lacked the necessary understanding of
the professions they sought to analyze, they lacked the objectivity that one expects of
serious researchers, and they lacked the 'expertise' to evaluate competently the
'proper' methodologies for questioned document examiners or any other forensic
scientist." Footnote 260 quotes a speech to a document examiner's group by attorney Thomas Black, (author of BLACK'S TEXAS EVIDENCE MANUAL) where he stated:
The [Exorcism] authors do not appear to understand the process that
document examiners go through to reach the conclusion that a signature is or is not authentic. The authors assume that lay people and
document examiners use the same process to reach a decision. It is
this erroneous assumption that makes their article as inexpert as their
statement that document examiners are inaccurate. When they state
that "no court has ever explicitly considered the field of document examination" one must respond, "neither did the authors."
Footnote 261 again attacks Denbeaux's qualifications, again setting out the Starrs
quote supra. Footnote 280, in commenting on the methodological criticism of
Kam I in Science and Nonscience, says:
Stating the above was clearly prelude to the inevitable denigration, by
a non-scientist lawyer the work of a true scientist [sic]. The pretense of
offering Science and Nonscience as a scholarly "expose" of handwriting
examination evidence, rather than a thinly disguised 'brief' in favor of
their own advocacy positions, is more offensive since the fact that the
authors use the articles as providing them with 'expert qualifications'
in the broad handwriting field is carefully concealed from the reader.
Thus, in citing the Starzecpyzel case, no mention is made that it was Professor Saks, co-author of both articles, who was the main "expert" witness, nor was any mention made anywhere in the article that Professor
Denbeaux, co-author of Exorcism, continues traveling around the country and testifying in every case in which the defendant can pay the
$2500 minimum fee that he charges per case. In several cases, Professor Denbeaux testified that he charged $250 per hour, but that in indigent defendant cases there was a $2500 limit to the fee he could
charge.
Footnote 281 says:
When a person adopts a categorical stand denying the legitimacy of a
profession, as the Exorcism authors have done, and further takes it to
the trial trail to advocate that position in litigation over a period of
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we have been reasonably thorough in collecting the scattered threads
of the bias/money/lack of qualifications attack in the footnote. We
trust that the reader will also begin to see some of the problems of
framing a response. Moenssens' attacks are certainly emphatic, but
are neither organized nor entirely consistent. Is it Moenssens' position, for
167 instance, that all three of us have testified as expert witnesses, or is it that only some of us have done so, as other passages
seem to say? The fact is, in the slightly less than 10 years since the
Exorcism article appeared, Denbeaux has testified in 15 cases, Saks in
one case, and Risinger in none (though he did consult with the defense in the Starzecpyzel case).m
We fail to comprehend the basis for Moenssens' general allegations regarding our "concealment" of relevant information in any of
our writings.'6 The positions we took in Exorcism were clear, unambiguous, and public. If a litigant thought it would be helpful to have
those positions explained in court so that better informed decisions
might be reached, how is it a criticism of our position that one or the
other of us agreed to do so? And as far as money is concerned, it
seems little criticism that the person testifying should be compensated for his time.
Besides getting paid, our greatest sin, individually or collectively,
seems to have something to do with the following words: "advocate,"
"bias," "partisan," "non-objective," and "pro-defense."' 70 In reality,
this sin reduces to our disagreement with Professor Moenssens. It is,
without doubt, true that we believe some things, as each of our prior
articles and Part I of this article have been directed toward elucidating. Since we believe the things we say, hedged with qualifications
though they may be, we are not reticent to explain them in such a
years, there is an understandable (though unjustified) desire to keep
rejecting, systematically, the efforts of anyone engaged in presenting
evidence showing that the advocate's premises were false.
Finally, footnote 347 in the conclusion states:
Their opinions must be dismissed as unwarranted, untenable, and erroneous. Perhaps the critics are also motivated by the strong pro defense/anti-prosecution bias which they carefully concealed from the
readers of their "articles." Some also engage in a profitable sideline of
appearing as expert witnesses, relying on these purportedly carefully
researched "studies" as their badge of expertise.
167

See Moenssens, Post-DaubertWorld, supra note 1, at 308 n.251.

168What

may really be motivating Moenssens is not that two of us have testified,

but that the testimony has had some effect. For instance, in nearly half of the cases
in which Denbeaux has been involved, either the expert has been withdrawn or the
result has been inconsistent with the expert's position.
16
See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1,at 308.
170 See, e.g., id. at 314 n. 281, 330
n.347.
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way so as to move others to come to share our view by reason and reflection. This seems to be what Moenssens damns as advocacy. We
thought that it was simply the nature of reasoned discourse, in academia or in the courtroom. Because we believe what we believe, according to Moenssens, we are "biased." The invocation of the word
"bias" conjures up the- related notion of "prejudice." However, we
like to think of our positions as "postjudices" - positions arrived at
after reflectively weighing such evidence as is available. Moenssens
charges our attitude with being "non-objective," especially as it relates
to our treatment of the Kam studies, and charges us with holding on
to our publicly espoused positions in the face of overwhelming new
evidence. 71 We will leave the evaluation of Moenssens' claims to the
readers of Part I, and of Science and Nonscience, except to assert once
again that we have attempted to be as skeptical as the needs of science and the legal system's stated ideology require while giving credit
where credit is due, even to personally hostile authors such as the
Galbraiths.'7
Finally, Moenssens charges us with a "pro-defendant bias" in
criminal cases. We believe we have a "pro-accuracy" bias within the
context of the notion of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We
would be delighted to have well-validated sources of information that
would dependably separate the innocent from the guilty, and subject
the guilty to substantial punishment. We just don't believe in indiscriminately sacrificing defendants to maintain the appearance of
such a system when evidence of the validity of that system's methods
is lacking. If this has become Moenssens' definition of "prodefendant," it marks a change of position for him,' 73 and one which

we view as unfortunate.
On the issue of our failure to "reveal" our biases,1 74 in the general sense discussed above, we wear our positions on the sleeve of
everything we write. In the specific sense, in Exorcism we revealed our
75
previous litigation involvement dealing with handwriting issues,
and in Science and Nonscience we stated Denbeaux's identity as the expert in the Velasquez case in the text.17 6 The principal author of Science
and Nonscience (Risinger) has never testified as an expert, and the
other author, (Saks) has testified only twice (once before and once
171

172
173
174

175
176

See id.at 314.

See supra note 25.

See supra note 107.
See, e.g., Moenssens, Post-DaubertWorld, supra note 1, at 255.
See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 776-77.
See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 32.
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after the publication of Exorcism). We do concede that it would have
been better to have indicated in Science and Nonscience that Professor
Saks testified in Starzecpyzel, if for no other reason than to have eliminated the single scrap of factually accurate complaint available to
Moenssens. Frankly, it didn't occur to us as being an issue, since all
we dealt with there in regard to the decision in Starzecpyzel was a textual analysis ofJudge McKenna's written opinion.
However, we would like to point out the gross double standard
Moenssens applies to us, as contrasted with Professor Kam. Kam has
testified as much, or almost as much, as Denbeaux, a fact about
which Moenssens is silent. Indeed, Kam and Denbeaux have often
been called by opposing sides in the same case. Yet Kam has not disclosed any of this in any of his publications. In fact, in Kam II and
Kam III he references the proceedings in eleven cases without indicating that he testified as an expert in ten of them.177

Frankly, we

never considered it much of an issue, but Moenssens' failure even to
note it, much less to manifest the same outrage at it as he has at what
turns out to be our single omission, speaks tellingly about what is
consistency
really going on in his Article. As we have already noted,
7
and even-handedness are not Moenssens' strengths.1 1

While we are on the question of Moenssens' consistency, let us
extend the analysis from failure to disclose to making money by being an expert 7 " and "'qualifications' to testify as 'experts[.]'" 80
Moenssens does seem genuinely outraged that Denbeaux would
"oppose government document experts" and get paid for doing it.'8'
At the same time, Moenssens totally ignores the fact that Kam has
undoubtedly been paid for his testimony, without the fee limitations
that apply to those testifying for indigent defendants. In addition,
nobody paid us to write Exorcism, while all Kam's research has been

177
178

See Kam II, supra note 8, at 785; Kam III, supra note 81, at 1003.
Moenssens himself has served as an expert in regard to fingerprint issues at

least as recently as 1994, and presumably he was paid for it. See Montana v. Cline,
909 P.2d 1171, 1177 (Mont. 1996). Yet, he does not explicitly note this in writings
on that subject, such as the Fingerprint chapter in SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIL AND
CRIMINAL CAsEs, supra note 107, at 495-554. Moenssens has also represented a DNA
laboratory, Lifecodes, in litigation, see Callahan v. Virginia, 379 S.E.2d 476 (Va.
1988), but has not revealed that fact in his writings on DNA dependability, such as
Andre A. Moenssens, DNA Evidence and Its Critics - How Valid Are the Challenges?, 31
JURIMETRICSJ. 81 (1990). Again, we don't think it is much of an issue, but it does
seem, once again, that Moenssens has a severe case of double standards.
79 See, e.g., Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 255-56.
o80Id. at 254.
181 See id. at 255.
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funded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) .'1 We want to
make it clear that we are not criticizing Kam for this, but if either
group is likely to have been influenced by monetary considerations, it
is not the "Risinger-Denbeaux-Saks" group."s
At root base, Moenssens' arguments about our qualifications to
evaluate evidence of validity are bankrupt. As we pointed out in Part
I, Moenssens' hope is to disqualify pesky critics from testifying by requiring that only guild members be looked upon as competent to testify about the weaknesses of handwriting identification. Being a practitioner of handwriting analysis, however, has little to do with either
designing tests to measure the performance of guild members according to a black box proficiency model, 184 or testifying to the implications of the weakness or absence of such testing. What is necessary
for the above tasks is the effort to design and administer the tests or
to gather the literature for review, and the critical skills to analyze
and interpret the data. Compare the "Kam group" with the "Risinger
group." Both have three working members. Both have one Ph.D. in
science, Kam and Saks. Kam's degree is in Electrical Engineering
and Computer Science, Saks's in Social Psychology (with an emphasis
on research methodology) . 5 No member of either group is trained
as a document examiner or has any hands-on experience as such. Yet
Moenssens views Kam not only as qualified to testify to the results of
his research, but as a virtual demi-god, while Saks and Denbeaux are
182

Professor Kam's 1997 curriculum vitae reveals that his group had by then re-

ceived $280,831 in grants from the FBI for handwriting related projects.
183 All QDEs testifying in support of their own expertise
(by far the most common
source of such testimony) are paid for their time, and earn their livings as a result of
their claimed expertise. Elsewhere Moenssens himself has recognized the magnitude of this problem: "More and more, the courts are coming to recognize
that.., the foundation for admissibility and the fact of general scientific recognition
'may not be established without the testimony of 'disinterested and impartial experts,' 'disinterested scientists whose livelihood was not intimately connected with
the new technique."' Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 115, at 5
(citations omitted). If personal monetary interest is the motivator that Moenssens
claims it is in regard to us, it is many times that in regard to every QDE.
184 See supra note 107. Note that we are not saying that practitioners
cannot or
should not have input into test design. Practitioner input can ensure that tests and
test materials are reasonably realistic and cover the range of problems most often
encountered in practice. However, it is not a sine qua non, and much of what the
researcher needs to know about such subtasks can be gained from reading the standard QDE literature. Kam had no apparent direct practitioner input in the design
of his tests, at least none that is revealed in the text of his articles, and Moenssens
has never criticized him for that.
185 On this score, Saks's degree is more pertinent, because the testing
of QDEs
deals with a human measurement problem. Kam's unfamiliarity with some of the
special problems of research on human subjects may explain some of the design
flaws in the Kam studies. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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viewed in the most contemptuous terms, unqualified to testify to the
results of their research because of their lack of training in document
examination. To us, there seems to be little doubt that all of these
persons should testify better to inform the court and the fact
finder of the data and its limits. But once again, Moenssens would
apply inconsistent standards in order to silence critics and protect
friends.
B. Faulty Testimony, Sloppy Scholarshipand Other Delicts.
We think it is safe to say that Moenssens has accused the Exorcism
article, and to a lesser extent Science and Nonscience, of bad scholarship using just about every negative adjective and rhetorical device
known to humankind, including damning our honesty with faint denial. ' 8 But when we look at the content of the specific charges made,
the charges begin to evaporate. Once again, as in the case of the
bias/money/qualifications argument, Moenssens' position is scattered, not fully consistent, and hard to pin down. We will therefore
attempt to collect all assertions about the deficiencies of our articles
that are not merely name calling, but which have some verifiable
content. We will begin with Moenssens' allegations asserting faults in
our testimony in judicial proceedings, and continue from there. Unlike the approach we adopted regarding Moenssens' bias/money/
qualifications argument, however, we will respond to each allegation
in turn:
1. In footnote 8, Moenssens quotes a passage from Denbeaux's
testimony under cross-examination in United States v. Martin'" as an
'
admission that the Exorcism article reached "extreme conclusions."'
Taken in context, however, Denbeaux's conclusions were simply that,
as of the date of publication of Exorcism,
I always took two positions: either their [the FSF] tests are invalid
and worthless or they are valid. The view turns out to be one of
two things: There are either no studies defending the ability of
handwriting experts to do that which they claimed they could do,

186

Moenssens' footnote 293 begins, "Lest one accuse them of intentional dishon-

esty, there were perhaps a number of understandable reasons for their confusion... ." See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 317 n.293. It is perhaps worth noting here that Professor Moenssens apparently holds no college or
university degrees except hisJ.D. from Chicago Kent Law School and his LL.M. from
Northwestern University.
187 No. 1:96-CR-287-JEC (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 1997); see Martin Transcript,
supra note
16, at 295.
188 See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supranote 1, at 255 n.8.
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or the studies that do exist, their studies seem to show they
can't.'8 9

That is, Denbeaux testified that the conclusions were extreme
because the facts were extreme, not because the conclusions were
unwarranted. Moenssens also quotes Denbeaux as saying that, in
light of Kam II, those conclusions "require readjustment."'90 Certainly it is true that the "no data to negative data"' 9' conclusion of Exorcism must be readjusted in light of Kam II, but as Denbeaux said
immediately thereafter in Martin, it is unclear that Kam II is "going to
,,192
lead to the change that the handwriting experts want ....
2. Later, in footnote 242, Moenssens tries to link the "extreme
conclusions" language just discussed to a passage much later in the
same testimony, where Denbeaux, being cross-examined on unpublished data he had received only the week before (which was later to
become Kam II), said that the conclusion of Exorcism
was an accurate depiction of the records at the time I wrote it,
and by no means am I saying it was inaccurate then. There is
Martin Transcript, supra note 16, at 294.
190See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 255 n.8.
191 See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 750.
192
The full context of the "extreme conclusions" quote, clearly referring to the
189

quoted conclusions in the text from page 294 of the transcript, occurs on pages 29596:
Q. Do you consider your law review article to be scientific?
A. Well, no, I wouldn't think it was scientific. It's a law review article.
It's an analysis of data. I think it's rational and logical and wellfounded and well-supported and its conclusions certainly are documented, but it is not science. I am a law professor studying the law
that exists and the data that exists and I report it.
Q. The data that existed at the time that you wrote the article?
A. Sure.
Q. Based upon the testimony that you have heard today, as well as information that you heard several weeks ago in a hearing here, U.S. versus Humphery, is it your understanding now that your law review article is outdated?
A. Well, certainly it's outdated. I don't know that that means that its
value is gone, but it's six years out of date if that's what you mean.
Q. Are your findings accurate?
A. Oh, the more data that comes in, it seems to me the more that the
extreme conclusions of our law review article probably require readjustment. I would say that Dr. Kam's last study certainly requires some
change. I am not sure it's going to lead to the change the handwriting
experts want, but it will certainly change the differences in the numbers.
Q. Is it not true now that there have been empirical studies done or
empirical studies done on the proficiency of document examiners?
A. Yes ....
Martin Transcript, supra note 16, at 295-96.
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more data. And the data obviously changes those numbers and it
clearly is not nearly as hideous as the situation in which handwriting examiners were virtually no better than flipping a coin."'
The trouble with Moenssens' argument is that the "extreme
conclusions" language did not refer to this, and that Exorcism reached
no such "extreme conclusions."'9 4 Exorcism did show that, under one
aggregation strategy, document examiners were right only fifty-seven
percent of the time,9 and also, for certain tasks in the FSF studies,
document examiners did no better than guessing. This conclusion
was confirmed by the Galbraiths's statistical analysis, which established that document examiners did no better than chance on two of
six subtasks reflected in the FSF studies." As we have explained in
Part I, Kam II had no direct bearing on those subtasks. 197 To that extent, Denbeaux bent over backward in his quoted statement to be
cautious and generous in the face of newly presented, unpublished
data.
3. In footnote eleven Moenssens says, noting the decision of the
Third Circuit in United States v. Velasquez,198 that this case ruled that "it
was an error to refuse to permit the defendant to call professor Mark
P. Denbeaux as an expert 'critic' of the field of handwriting analysis,
' 2
On the contrary, the Court made no
and as a handwriting analyst."'
such ruling regarding Professor Denbeaux's competence as a handwriting analyst, as footnote 6 of the opinion explicitly states.0 0
Rather, Denbeaux was found to be an expert on the "limitations of
handwriting analysis., 2 0 ' Moenssens then says,
The decision in Velasquez to find error in excluding Denbeaux's
testimony was, at least in part, based on the Hon. Judge Roth's
mistaken belief, from his testimony, that he was a social scientist and
statistician, which he was not. Denbeaux, when apprised of the
judge's erroneousfactual assumptions, failed to notify her of the discrep202

ancy.
195

Id. at 313.

94 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
95 See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supranote 2, at 748.
9

See Galbraith et al., supranote 25, at 15 tbl.3.

See supra, text accompanying note 54.
19864 F.3d 844 (3d Cir. 1995).
97
9
200

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 255 n.ll (emphasis added).
See Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 848 n.6. The court stated that: "[W]e need not ad-

dress the issue of whether Professor Denbeaux was qualified to testify as to his ability -

or inability -

ment." Id.
201 See id. at 846.
202

to identify the handwriting exemplars proffered by the Govern-

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 255 n.11 (emphasis added).

1998]

REPLY TO MOENSSENS

463

It is true that Judge Roth's opinion in Velasquez contained a
footnote stating, among many other things, that Denbeaux had testified that he had "spent four years as a statistical social scientist. 2 0 In
fact, what Denbeaux had testified to in the proceeding in the court
below was that, while on the faculty at Seton Hall University School of
Law, he had spent four years as an American Bar Foundation fellow
working with co-author Dr. Alan Katz on a social science research
project concerning the effects of law school on student cynicism, and
that this project involved the gathering and statistical analysis of data.
Partially as a result of significant health problems, Denbeaux paid little attention to the terms of the Velasquez opinion when it was issued,
most particularly the footnotes. When he noticed the wording of the
footnote in the fall of 1995 (he was not "apprised"), he consulted
Charles Sullivan, Associate Dean of Seton Hall University School of
Law, as to whether the court's statement was sufficiently inaccurate to
require response. To be cautious, Denbeaux then called the Third
Circuit clerk's office to inquire about the proper procedures to follow in order to address the issue, and was told that it was too late for
anything to be done. Moenssens knew all of this, since it was explained in Denbeaux's testimony in the Martin case, which was cited
elsewhere by Moenssens.
4. Later, in the same footnote, Moenssens says:
Professor Denbeaux was still testifying, attacking the reliability of
handwriting identification evidence in trials as late as June of
1997, ready to criticize on the witness stand a more recent empirical study by a respected university-affiliated research scientist, Dr.
Moshe Kam, that supported the abilities of document examiners
in identifying handwritings of individuals, even though Denbeaux
admitted only having heard about the study an hour earlier2 °4when Dr.
Kam testified and without having studied the Kam report itself

The highlighted statement is a total fiction. Perhaps it resulted from
an unaccountable conflation of the details of three different cases,
20 6
United States v. Humphery,2 °0 United States v. Martin,
and United States
v. Paul.2 7 The "more recent study" Moenssens refers to must be Kam

II, since Kam I had been published and Kam III had not yet been
produced. Denbeaux first heard about Kam II not through Kam's
testimony, but when he was confronted with it on cross examination
Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 847 n.4.
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 255 n.11 (emphasis added).
M No. 94-CR-447-JEC (N.D. Ga. 1997).
2W
No. 96-CR-287-JEC (N.D. Ga. 1997).
207
No. 97-9302 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
20s
20

464

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:405

in Humphery, even though it had not been published or previously
produced in discovery, and at that time Denbeaux refused to make
any substantive comment at all until he was given an opportunity to
read it.208 Denbeaux was supplied with a copy of Kam II a week later

(the prosecutor would not let him keep the one he was shown in
Humphery), and when he testified concerning certain weaknesses that
his preliminary evaluation revealed, such as the incentive problem
discussed in Part I, supra, he had possessed the report for almost a
week. (Kam later admitted that those criticisms, and related criticisms
by Saks, were the reasons for Kam III.)2 19 It is true that Denbeaux fur-

ther criticized Kam II in Paul, in June of 1997, but by that time he
had possessed Kam II for nearly four months. Thus, Denbeaux did
not first hear of Kam II from Kam's testimony, and never testified
critically concerning anything he had only seen an hour before, or
that he had never studied. How Moenssens could innocently have
confused the record to this degree is for the reader to evaluate.
5. In footnote 221, Moenssens states that, despite lack of qualification, Professor Denbeaux "proffered an opinion as to the invalidity
of a specific identification in one case."21 If by this he means that
Denbeaux testified about the weaknesses of a QDE's identification
and the dangers of relying on it, it is true that Denbeaux has done
that in a number of cases, as Velasquez held he was qualified to do. If
Moenssens means to say that Denbeaux offered his affirmative opinion that the defendant in a given case did not write the questioned
document, this has never happened, and it never will happen.
6. Returning to footnote 11, Moenssens says of Saks's testimony
in Starzecpyzel, that he "admitted that he had not read all of the technical literature 2 1 ' and further that "[h]is testimony also showed that
he was unaware of the terminology in use in the questioned document examination profession. 2 12 The "technical literature" referred
to consisted of various writings by handwriting identification experts
of a non-empirical nature, and the terminology was the specialized
terminology reflected in that literature. Professor Saks was not testifying as a document examiner, but rather as a social scientist and research methodologist conversant with human skills testing issues. As

208

Transcript of Proceedings at 32, 93, 94, United States v. Humphery, No. 94-

CR-447-JEC (N.D. Ga.Jan. 8, 1997).
209 See Gilreathdepositions, supra note 64, at 48-49 (deposition of Kam).
210 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 300 n.221, (citing Transcript
of Proceedings, United States v. Pravato at 1598, No. 95-CR.981 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)).
211
212

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supranote 1, at 255 n.l1.
- .
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such, the things that Saks "admitted" he had not read were as irrelevant to his witness function as Finnegans Wake (which he also admits
he has not read).
7. In addition, Moenssens asserts in footnote 11 that Saks
"conceded that in formulating his Exorcism findings, he had made a selective use of 'short answers' given to certain tests but had ignored the reasoning expressed by the persons tested.",2 3 First, Saks never testified that he
made "selective" use of anything. He did testify that in formulating
the analysis in Exorcism we utilized the response categories assigned
both by the test subjects and the FSF, and did not, based on narrative
explanations, reassign answers to categories not assigned by the experts themselves.1 We have dealt with this issue extensively in Science
and Nonscience, and in Part 1.215 We feel that this decision was the
right one, but whatever one's opinion on that, the decision hardly
constitutes "selective use."
8. Referring to the fact that a version of Science and Nonscience
appeared as a chapter in Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Sciof Expert Testimony, Moenssens suggests that there is something
wrong or unusual in publishing a version of an article as a book
chapter (referring to it as "recycling" in footnotes 6 and 249, and saying in footnote 215, "In an age that applauds 'recycling' as 'politically
correct' such multiple use of one's literary (if not scholarly) product
is no doubt a laudable civic pursuit 2 17 (and he attacks us for sarcasm)). However, the book chapter was clearly identified as a version
of an article previously published in the Iowa Law Review, 28 and this is
neither uncommon nor dishonorable. For instance, in the same
treatise, Kaye and Freedman's chapter on statistical proof was a revised version of a chapter in the Federal Judicial Center's Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence.1 9
9. Moenssens states (without reference to any specific language)
that in our "more recent" writings (presumably Science and Non213

214

Id. (emphasis added).
This appears to be what Moenssens means by "short answers," though these

would best be characterized simply as the "answers" to the questions that were asked,
the narrative being merely supplemental. Where Moenssens gets the phrase "short

answers," which he sets out in quotation marks, is a mystery.
See supra note 57.
2 6 See MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE,
supra note 40, § 22.
2:5

217
218
219

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 299 n.215.
See MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 40, § 22 at 79.
See id. § 3 (stating in a footnote that the chapter "is an expanded and revised

version of David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 331 (Federal Judicial Center ed.,
1994).-).
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science), we "argue that because handwriting identification is 'nonscientific' according to the Daubert model, it ought to be barred from
the courtroom and that such a conclusion legally flows from recent
case law."2 20 This is an example of a mischaracterization undertaken
in order to subject us to ridicule for positions we did not take. Nowhere have we made such a silly argument. What we do argue is that
all expertise must be subject to the best criteria of validity of which
the subject matter will admit, and that for forensic identification procedures like handwriting, if they cannot be validated internally as sciences they must be subject to external black box validity testing.22'
We argue that this has not been done sufficiently in regard to handwriting identification.
10. A related Moenssens tactic is to put things in quotes in such
a way so as to suggest that we said them, when we never said such
things.
Thus, in footnote 222, Moenssens says, "The Exorcism.. .authors begin their 'destruction' of the handwriting identification lore by discussing the so-called 'Inbau Study' .
We
never asserted that we were undertaking a "destruction" of the handwriting identification lore, or anything else. Similarly, on page 301,
Moenssens writes, "While the Exorcism authors' methodology and
thoroughness in research might be questioned seriously, what was
wrong with their 'revelation' that handwriting identification did not
represent "scientific knowledge? 2 23 Again, we never claimed to be
making a "revelation" about this, or anything else. 4

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supranote 1, at 255.
See supra note 109.
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supranote 1, at 300 n.222, 301.
23 Id. at
301.
24 Three other minor points may profitably be disposed
of here without burdening the text. The first is the claim made by Moenssens in footnote 240 that at the
1996 Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Science, we retaliated to audience hostility "in kind by referring depreciatingly and sarcastically to the questioned
document examiners as 'you people better get your act together [sic]."' Those
words were spoken, but by another panelist, not by any of us. The second is the assertion made in footnote 259 that "Exorcism began as a 'brief' in the trial of the Mayflower Madam." This is untrue. Denbeaux and Risinger first began reflecting on
the validity of handwriting identification in the late 1970s in connection with an examination of the Lindbergh baby kidnapping case, and the issue was first raised in
court as early as 1980, as was clearly indicated in Exorcism, supranote 2, at 776 n.196.
The third point is the assertion in footnote 249 that we resist the truth revealed by
the Kam research because it "removes the underpinnings of... [our] reasons for
'being' in the academic world." We would simply reply that each of us has other
academic accomplishments that we like to think are at least as significant as whatever
we have done in regard to handwriting identification.
220

221
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11. In footnote 8, Moenssens begins his attack on the thoroughness of our literature search in Exorcism, which continues at
various points throughout the article. This has been dealt with in
Part I.A.1, supra.
12. In footnote 8, Moenssens further observes that "the article
[Exorcism] was not peer-reviewed nor was it submitted to questioned
document examiners or other scholars with experience in the forensic sciences...

a theme that he repeats at footnote 232 where he

says (while writing in a law review), "Need it be stressed at this time
that law reviews are not peer-reviewed publications? The editors'
work on a professor-authored article submitted for publication tends
to be deferential - let alone one written by three law professors, especially if it is lengthy and full of extensive footnotes!, 226 How
"deferential" the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
tend to be is debatable, considering the fact that they reject significandy more than ninety percent of the articles submitted. However,
this line of attack does raise an interesting issue, and one of the detail
weaknesses of the Daubert opinion: the confusion ofjuried selection
of articles for publication with the much broader concept of peer review. The norm in many academic areas is for journals to select articles for publication through juries of professionals or academics.
This is the initial stage of "peer review." The most important peer
review comes after publication as articles are digested, critiqued, and
evaluated by the greater interested intellectual community.22 7 The
utilization of peer juries has strengths and weaknesses. It may often
prevent publication of only the most transparenly bankrupt research, since there are so many journals and such a variety of juries
that almost everything apparently respectable will find a slot someplace. As to any given journal in the food chain of prestige, the jury
system can be criticized for potentially institutionalizing single doctrinaire viewpoints.22 1 Whatever the merits of such a system, law reviews are by tradition student juried, a system which has its own
strengths and weaknesses. Many law reviews attempt to combine the
virtues of both systems by involving faculty members in the evaluation
process under various circumstances. In the case of the Exorcism article, it was reviewed and recommended prior to acceptance for publi25

226
27

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supranote 1, at 255 n.8.

Id. at 304 n.232.

At one point Moenssens suggests, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, that "answers on

cross-examination provide us with a certain degree of 'peer review' ... ," Moenssens,
Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 254, even though, of course, the purposes of ob-

jective peer evaluation and advocacy cross examination are radically different.
228 See DANIELMCNEIL & PAUL FREIBERGER, FUZzY LOGIC, 75-77 (1993).
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cation by Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice at the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
whom we are happy to count as a peer. The main point of Moenssens' attack seems to be that criticisms that cannot meet the approval
of a jury of professional document examiners ought not to be published or paid any attention.2
13. On page 266, Moenssens asserts that "four unrelated occurrences" have "placed questioned document examination in the remarkable position of having to defend its place among the forensic
sciences.,

23 0

He then lists:

"(1) the almost casual manner in which

the law of expert handwriting evidence has developed in our courts
from the earliest cases through modern times; (2) the growth of the
substantial body of handwriting 'experts' whose professional roots
originate in graphology and graphoanalysis"; (3), the Daubert decision; and (4), the publication of Exorcism.31 In footnote 47 he then
criticizes Science and Nonscience for crediting only two of the four, the
Daubertcase and the publication of Exorcism. However, it was Exorcism
that first publicly documented the "casual manner in which the law of
expert handwriting evidence has developed ....,,23 and in that sense

the two are hardly unrelated or separate. As to the doctrinal rift between orthodox Osbornians and graphologically oriented practitioners, this rift was hardly known at all outside of document examiner
circles before it was documented publicly in Science and Nonscience, so
how it could have contributed to the existence of the legal controversy is unclear. We suppose Moenssens' argument is that all lack of
data, all inaccurate results, and all poor performances are attributable to graphologists, so that is how any controversy developed. As
we explained in Part I, however, the lack of data applies to all document examiners, and such negative data as exist come from tests administered largely to Osbornians. 233
14. In footnote 87, Moenssens accuses us of "still" failing to
"appreciate the width and breadth of handwriting identification
'types' and their differences in methodology and competency.,04
22

At another point, Moenssens admits that Exorcism has received generally favor-

able post-publication response, but claims that we merely pulled the wool over the
eyes of such gullible scholars as Professors Margaret Berger, Ron Carlson, Paul

Giannelli, Roger Park, Richard Rakos, and Stephan Landsman. See Moenssens, PostDaubert World, supra note 1, at 298 n.208, 299 n.215.
230 Id. at 266.
231 Id.
232
253
2

Id.
See supra note 57.

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 273 n.87.
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Presumably the "still" refers to both Science and Nonscience and to a
quote from Denbeaux in the Martin case referring to "the range of
handwriting experts who are out there testifying, some of whom may
have done a great deal of work, others ... very little ... and most

handwriting experts admit that there is a wide range of trained and
prepared people performing as handwriting experts."2 5 Denbeaux
testified to no more than that which Moenssens himself repeatedly
claims - that there is a wide range of training and preparation represented among those who testify in court as handwriting experts. 36
The major irony is that the first publication that generally outlined
the main doctrinal split between Osbornians and graphologyinfluenced handwriting identification experts was Science and Nonscience.
15. On pages 297-98 Moenssens writes:
Since finding and critically reviewing scientific material can be a
daunting task for a lawyer, it is very tempting to accept statements

in law review articles about scientific issues as gospel. Thus, little
critical analysis of the accuracy of a law review author's factual
statements and conclusions occurs. After all, nearly2 3each
state7
ment in the law review article isjustified by a footnote!
At this point Moenssens makes clear, were there any doubt, that he is
referring to Exorcism, and continues:
The practice of citing law review articles for scientific facts or
technical conclusions is an undertaking fraught with the danger
of unwitting error. The danger is magnified when the article's
author is not a scientist or a specialist in a technical field, but either a lawyer or a law student writing a note or comment, purporting to evaluate the scientific or technical worth of a specialized
discipline, rather than on the state of the law as it relates to that
discipline. Thus, law review authors cite other law review authors
who cite other law review authors ....
Law professors also struggle with what constitutes scholarship .... When they write a lengthy article, such as the Exorcism
publication, purporting to have done a thorough investigation of
a technical field, they suddenly become the scholars on the subject. Thus it was the case [sic] with an article critiquing the validId. (quoting MartinTranscript supra note 16, at 321).
How is Denbeaux's testimony substantially different than this passage from
Moenssens: "The task of comparing known and unknown handwriting specimens
for the purpose of determining whether they were produced by the same author is
currently practiced by a wide variety of individuals, of greatly differing backgrounds,
training, and experience." Id. at 252.
235

2%

237

Id. at 297-98.
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ity of handwriting identification evidence. As might be expected,
the article has been cited in other law reviews as 'gospel truth' for
its conclusions, despite the limited acceptance it has received in

the courts. 238
This passage suggests that we were merely three random legal academics with no ability to examine technical science subjects at all.
First, as Moenssens himself, somewhat inconsistently, is at pains to
point out elsewhere in his article, academic credentials are not a sine
qua non of critical abilities. 9 Second, neither Denbeaux nor Risinger will plead guilty to being so math and science phobic that they
are incapable of making valid and instructive observations. However,
the real kicker in this passage is how, as usual, Moenssens attempts to
diminish or conceal the credentials and the role of Dr. Michael J.
Saks in both Exorcism and Science and Nonscience. Saks is responsible
for much of the technical text in both articles (and this one). In addition, he is responsible for evaluating and approving all text dealing
with any scientific or statistical issues. He stands behind all of what
has been said, and if Moenssens wants to get at Denbeaux and Risinger• he 240
will have to come through Saks. Given Saks's general qualifications,
the only remaining claim for Moenssens is that only a
document examiner can offer any observations that ought to be
Id. at 298-99 (footnotes omitted).
"Thus, it is not the existence of academic degrees, or their absence, that determines whether scientific methods are being used." Id. at 321.
240 Professor Saks earned his Ph.D. in social psychology,
with an emphasis on research methodology and statistics. At the University of Iowa he is the Edward F.
Howrey Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology. He has regularly taught courses in research methodology and statistics, not only at Iowa but also
at Boston College, Georgetown University Law Center, Ohio State University, Arizona State University, and the University of Virginia (where for a decade he taught
the subject in an LL.M. program for appellate judges). Saks has had extensive experience reviewing empirical research studies in his role as editor-in-chief of a peer reviewed journal (Law & Human Behavior) and as an editorial board member and peer
reviewer for numerous other journals. Similarly, he has evaluated research proposals for the National Science Foundation and regularly is called upon by various other
organizations to serve as a reviewer of empirical social science research and of proposals for research. In addition, he has conducted numerous empirical research
studies of his own and written literature reviews involving the evaluation and synthesis of empirical research studies on various topics, but mostly on studies of decisionmaking within the legal system. His empirical research findings have been relied on
as authority in numerous judicial opinions, including several by the United States
Supreme Court. He is the author or editor of 10 books and author of nearly 100 articles in both refereed journals and law reviews. The multi-volume work, MODERN
238
29

THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 40,
which he co-edited and co-authored, has recently been characterized by evidence
scholarJohn Strong as a work that "sets a new standard of excellence." John Strong,
A Guide to Daubert, 82JUMACATURE 39, 40 (1998) (book review).
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:
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given any credence, which of course is inconsistent with his nearcanonization of Kam.
16. On page 300, Moenssens claims that the Exorcism article was
published "under a titillating title that began with an allusion to
witchcraft:

the article Exorcism."2 4

One does not exorcise witches,

one exorcises demons in cases of possession. As the text of Exorcism
makes abundantly clear, the title refers to the human tendency
"under the stress of having to wrestle with important types of facts
about which there is no good evidence" to create "a proxy for rational knowledge, a form with the appearance of evidence but no rational content,
to be used in a ritual exorcism of an ignorance we
2 42

cannot bear.

17. On page 300, Moenssens further says that "the Inbau and
Forensic Science Foundation studies that the authors reported on in
Exorcism were admittedly defective ones," but then says "they were indeed not intended to be valid appraisals on [sic] the ability of handwriting experts to identify handwritings and it was improper for the
Exorcism authors to cite them for that purpose. ' 23

The questions

concerning the propriety of examining the FSF studies to see what, if
anything, they might mean, is dealt with in Part I.24 However, we will
consider in more detail whether our treatment of the Inbau study in
Exorcism was proper.
In footnote 222, Moenssens asserts that we were in error in referring to the Inbau study as a "'primitive and flawed validity study
from nearly 50 years ago[. ,,245Moenssens then says that "[t] he gross
mischaracterization of this study alone as a validity test of the abilities
of document examiners casts serious doubt on the research methodology of the Exorcism authors., 246 He then reinforces this assertion

with a quotation from a memorandum authored by Inbau five decades after the fact, that the Inbau study
"was conducted merely to demonstrate the invalidity of the evidentiary rule at that time which permitted lay witnesses to express
an opinion regarding a disputed signature or other piece of

241
242
24S

24
245

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 300.
Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 782.
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 300.
See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 300 n.222 (quoting Risinger et

al., Exorcism, supra note 2,at 738).
246
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handwriting based upon a memory comparison between it and
the writing of a person which they had seen at an earlier time.",47
Moenssens then concludes that this "was its only purpose; it was never
intended as a validity study of anything, nor was it represented as
such. "48

Was it or was it not a "validity study?" The Inbau study involved
testing how well various people could identify the genuineness of actual and forged signatures. The people were the "instruments" being
tested. The types of people tested were law professors, their secretaries, bank employees, professional document examiners, and people
of assorted other occupations. The criterion against which their
conclusions on any given item were evaluated for correctness was the
known authorship of the documents. This fits the description of
what testing researchers would call a validity study. Perhaps this
would have been more obvious if the study had included calculations
of the correlation between the participants' conclusions and the criterion of ground truth. That correlation would be termed a validity
coefficient in psychometric research, which in a very real sense is
what the Inbau study is: measurement of certain abilities among
people.
By its own terms, the Inbau study seems plainly to be a study of
the relative accuracy (that is, validity) of different ways the law might
try to determine the genuineness of writings. In the study's introduction, Inbau wrote:
Although the present time is a rather late date in the history of
our law of evidence to question the validity of so well established a
practice as the identification of disputed handwriting by lay witnesses, the following discussion is devoted to an experiment conducted for the sole purpose of ascertaining the accuracy of this
method of identification.
Later in the article, Inbau explains:
[T] he suggestion was made that it would be of interest to ascertain the degree of success [handwriting] experts could attain in
their examination of the same signatures. With the scope of the
experiment thus extended, the writer ....test[ed] ... professional experts ....

Id.(quoting Fred E. Inbau, Memorandum to all Faculty Members of Northwestern University School of Law (Aug. 23, 1989)).
247

249

250

The Inbau study, supranote 44, at 434.
Id. at 436.
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By including QDEs in his study, Inbau created the possibility of
comparing the relative accuracy (validity) of lay people versus QDEs.
Simply because the study was a poor one does not make it nonexistent. Inbau's study did make a very limited comparison of QDEs
using comparisons to non-experts and did evaluate the accuracy of all
the people tested. If there is a more apt description of that aspect of
the study (the aspect relevant to Exorcism and the present discussion)
than that which we advanced by our having referred to it as a
"primitive and flawed" "validity study," then by all means tell us, and
we will be happy to use the more apt term.
Moreover, that the study's weaknesses for the purpose of our article led us to place no reliance on its findings would seem to render
entirely moot Professor Moenssens' frenzied charges of "gross mischaracterization" and "misrepresentation." We gave the study zero
weight. What less would Professor Moenssens have had us do?
18. Moenssens writes on page 301:
Exorcism's main premise that because the reliability of handwriting
identification evidence could not be mathematically or scientifically established, a confidence in the ability of the experts engaging in handwriting analysis had not been verified statistically, and
courts ought not to admit it, seemed a clear non sequitur. Handwriting evidence was already firmly ensconced in the courts, and
such evidence could rely on a century and a half of judicial approval .... 25

First, to the extent we understand what this sentence means, it does
not represent what we said. What we said was, "If handwriting identification testimony were to be proffered and treated as a case of first
impression now, the proponent would clearly have the burden of
proving the existence of the claimed skill, a burden that has yet to be
met in any forum

-

legal, scholarly or scientific.

2 52

We then went on

to say, "Despite the undeniable power of this argument, we are not so
naive as to think that courts will be receptive to demands for exclusion of such testimony ....

They are likely to continue admitting

such evidence just because it has always been admitted, at least within
living memory., 251 We are at a loss to see how these observations
qualify as non sequiturs. We might well respond with a Latin
apho24
rism of our own: All we were arguing was "ex nihilo nihilfit.'

252

Id at 301.
Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 772.

253

Id. at 773.

254

"Out of nothing comes nothing," or more appropriately to the point of the

251

Exorcism article, ought to come nothing.
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19. In footnote 222, Moenssens attacks our decision to consider
anything generated by the FSF studies in the following terms:
The Exorcism authors' attack on the Forensic Sciences Foundation
(FSF) studies, again, was totally unwarranted and evidence of
poor scholarship. The FSF studies were, admittedly, poorly conceived, poorly administered, and poorly interpreted. However, to
rely on the FSF studies in support of conclusions about the proficiency, or lack thereof, of document examiners as a profession is
an absolute non sequitur.25
Again, our understanding of "non sequitur" and Moenssens' seems to
be radically different, and the meaning of this passage in general is a
little obscure. We did not "attack" the FSF studies, though we did
note some weaknesses, which Moenssens appears to concede completely. Our main sin seems to be not attacking the FSF studies, but
reporting them. However, Moenssens fails to report that we also said
this:
It must be noted here that FSF's Proficiency Advisory Committee
disavows these tests as representative of the level of performance
in any of the fields being tested. Because of the high level of
anonymity maintained an& the limited amount of information
collected by the proficiency testing program, it is not known who
takes the tests for any laboratory or what techniques they used.
Accordingly, we use them only to answer one conservative question: Do these data provide any additional evidence
of the exis6
tence of handwriting identification expertise?11

Also, as we noted in Science and Nonscience, if the FSF had regarded the tests as totally meaningless, they would have ceased to give
them or to issue reports providing aggregate data.5 7 One can be forgiven for inferring that the FSF disclaimer was at least in part politically motivated. They were attempting to obtain participation with
their proficiency testing program, and the disclaimer attempting to
prevent the use of the information for evaluative purposes on any
greater level than the local lab level, at least by anyone outside the
FSF, may have been seen as a stimulant to cooperation. The FSF's
own proficiency committee reports treat the data as at least suggestive
or provisionally meaningful, and our similar treatment after disclosure of the FSF's disclaimer is hardly "totally unwarranted and evidence of poor scholarship."2

255

256
27

258

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 300 n.222.

Risinger et al., Exorcism, supranote 2, at 744 n.47.
See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 42.

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 300 n.222.

1998]

REPLY TO MOENSSENS

475

20. The specifics of footnote 222 introduce Moenssens' main
and favorite rhetorical ploy - the McCarthyite claim that he knows
of many errors of a type he illustrates with only one or two examples,
which he asserts are typical, and which often turn out not to be errors
at all. Regarding the treatment of the FSF studies in Exorcism, Moenssens writes:
Even so, the Exorcism authors inaccurately reported on what had
been published. See, e.g. the mischaracterization/misquote of
the 1975 FSF test's results when stating that "4(5%) said they
could not make any conclusion from what had been submitted."
In fact, the actual text ofJ. Peterson... stated that "[f] our laboratories, or 5.4%, reported inconclusive results but specifically mentioned in their reports that they noted significant agreement between
the questioned material and the exemplar handwriting of
2 59
'B. '
Moenssens then invokes the "junk scholarship" reference. 2 60
Please. We did not directly quote anything. We set out data in a data
table. It mischaracterized nothing. Our table accurately reported
four inconclusives, which is how these results were characterized both
in the report and by the tested document examiners themselves. We
presented accurate percentages, in whole numbers with no decimal
places. This was the practice we followed in all of our data tables, because we deemed such decimals insignificant digits. We nowhere reported inconclusives as "leaners" based on test taker narratives,
whether the test taker was leaning toward right or wrong answers.
We simply accepted the bottom-line characterizations of the report
and the submitting laboratory. We still believe this approach is the
best one for the data, as we indicated in Science and Nonscience2 6 1 (a
fact nowhere noted by Moenssens). Indeed, it was the decision of the
Galbraiths to go back and count inconclusives as correct answers in
their article, a main point of debate between them and us, which we
explored at length in Science and Nonscience.62 While there may be
debate about whether such responses should properly be counted as
"qualified opinions" or merely "bet hedges," our approach was hardly
evidence of "junk scholarship."
21. Moenssens criticizes us on page 301 as follows:
The Exorcism authors, while studying so much published information, had missed more than they had examined since they con259
2W
261
262

Id. (citing Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 744) (citations omitted).
See Moenssens, Post-DaubertWorld, supra note 1, at 330 n.348.
See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 53.
See id. at 50-58.
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fined their studies to the 'book' literature, which turned up graphological as well as true document identification texts. They
missed most of the periodic literature and all of the voluminous
private research papers about on-going research efforts that were
being shared freely by professional document experts attending
regular training sessions and association meetings around the
263
country.
In Part I, we dealt globally with the charge that our literature
search was deficient. All that needs to be said here is that, as we
noted in Exorcism,2 we consulted Maureen Casey Owens, past president of the ASQDE and then chief document examiner for the Chicago Police Department, in formulating our literature search. We
missed none of the periodical literature written in English, at any
rate. And, as we continue to repeat, if there was any empirical data
reported anywhere which we missed in 1988, no one has cited such a
study yet, including Moenssens. His main criticism seems to be that
we did not consult unpublished sources, for Moenssens goes on:
[b]efore the fairly recent (1995) appearance of the specialized
publication International Journal of Forensic Document Examiners, much of the research that was pursued by members of the
ASQDE was circulated privately only within the perhaps less than
100 person group of highly skilled questioned document examin265
ers.
Moenssens continues:
The relatively small size of the interested audience caused traditional journals to be less interested in publishing limited-interest
research papers; therefore, the research remained known only to
a small group of professionals. It was indeed in these training
seminar papers and the modern articles and monographs circulated among the professionals that the bulk of the 'scientific' research was featured.2
Criticizing us for not discovering and examining such unpublished
material borders on the ludicrous,6 7 especially since Moenssens elsewhere in the article seems to claim that even published articles
should be given short shrift if not selected for publication by peerju263

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 301.

26

See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 783.

2

2

267

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 301 n.223.

Id. at 301-02.
Any implication that unpublished material would have been readily available

must be evaluated in light of the recent siege mentality of the QDE community. The

ASQDE website is passworded beyond the homepage, and Professor Saks has been
refused copies of conference papers that he has requested.
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ries. None of this, however, should obscure the fact that, as yet, no
one, Moenssens included, has pointed out a single non-anecdotal
empirical study that existed in 1988 that we missed.
22. In attempting to document his charge that Exorcism's "tone
was sarcastic" Moenssens cites the following:
a. Moenssens says, "Handwriting identification is referred to
as a 'spot' within judicial decisions.' 68 Actually, it is the judicial decisions themselves and their lack of analysis (or, as Moenssens himself
characterizes them, "their almost casual manner") 29 that were referred to as forming a spot. The actual text reads:
Most judicial thinking on how to deal with asserted expertise in
the courtroom is a product of the 20th century. The law has not
yet worked out a coherent theory of control, and the results of judicial decision have
been spotty. The rest of this Article is about
270
one of the spots.

b. Most of the other examples that Moenssens proffers deal
with our discussion of Inbau, Wigmore, and Osborn, and have been
dealt with elsewhere. 7' One further fairly egregious mischaracterization is worth noting here, however. Moenssens says, "The authors
stated that handwriting identification boasted 'no [] discipline
... except in the most desultory, disorganized, nascent, casual jackleg [sic] fashion ....

The actual passage from which the quoted

language was taken refers only to the period prior to the Common
Law Procedure Act of 1854: 273 "As we have seen, however, no such

discipline seems to have existed in English speaking countries prior
to the passage of the statute except in the most desultory, disorganized, nascent, casual, jackleg fashion ....

This is a statement even

Albert Osborn would have agreed with, applied to its time and place.
What, if anything, Moenssens sought to accomplish by the misleadingly edited and quoted passage, beyond further scandalizing us, is
for the reader to determine.

26

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 302 n.226 (citing Risinger et

al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 733).
26 See supraPart II.6.
270

Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 732-33.

271 See supra text accompanying notes 151-62.
27 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note

1, at 302 n.226 (quoting Risinger et
al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 758) (alterations in Moenssens, Post-Daubert World).
273 Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 125 § 27 (Eng.).
274

Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 758.
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23. In attempting to document his assertion that we were
"scornful" in our "speculative conclusory statements at times 2 75
Moenssens cites the following, which are responded to seriatim:
a. Moenssens quotes us as saying, "'Because of complaints
from document examiners that prior tests were too difficult, the Proficiency Advisory Committee decided to make the 1987 test easy.' ' 76
We did say that. What Moenssens omits is the next sentence, quoting
the FSF report: "According to the report, '[t] his test was designed to
be a relatively easy and straightforward test, because of complaints
about previous test design.' '2

77

Exactly how were we here being

"scornful" in our "speculative conclusory statements?" Where the
scorn, and more importantly, where the speculation?
b. In Moenssens' second example of us being "scornful" in
our "speculative conclusory statements" he quotes us as follows:
"Inbau experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining the assistance of professional document examiners ....

In certain instances

the real reason was undoubtedly the examiner's unwillingness to subject his reputation to any sort of experimentation. ''271 What Moenssens fails to note is that everything after the word "Inbau" is a direct
quote from Inbau's article, in Inbau's words, and is clearly indicated as such
by us.2 79 Thus, if anyone was being "scornful" in a "speculative conclu-

sory" statement, it was Inbau. We merely reported what he wrote.
(We think he probably had good ground for his conclusion.) Again,
what motivated Moenssens' erroneous attribution beyond the desire
to scandalize is for the reader to decide.
c. Moenssens' last purported example of us being "scornful"
in "speculative conclusory statements" is quoted: "' [T] here is at least
some anecdotal historical evidence that prosecutors can negotiate
with forensic scientists to turn inconclusive or even negative reports
into something that sounds inculpatory in court.' 2 80 We did say that
in footnote 72 of Exorcism, but we then continued, "This is what apparently happened with the ballistician in the government's case
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 302.
Id. at 302 n.227 (quoting Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 747).
277 Risinger et. al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 747 (quoting COLLABORATIVE
TESTING
275
276

SERVICES, INC., CRIME LABORATORY TESTING PROGRAM,

REP. No. 87-5, QUESTIONED
DOCUMENTS ANALYSIS 1 (1987)) (brackets in Risinger et al., Exorcism).

278 Moenssens, supra note 1, at 302 n.227 (quoting
Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra
note 2, at 741 n.44).
27 See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 741 n.44 (quoting
Inbau Study, supra note 44, at 440).
280 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note
1, at 302 n.227 (quoting Risinger et
al., Exorcism, supranote 2, at 747 n.72).
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against Sacco and Vanzetti," citing authoriy.
qualified statements count as "speculative conclusory statements" is a
mystery to us. Certainly the slanting of testimony in ways notjustified
by the data but favorable to the prosecution has been repeatedly
documented, most recently by the Inspector General's report on the
FBI Crime Laboratory,28' and has been
recognized as a danger by
2
Moenssens himself in other writings. 3
24. In documenting his assertion that we were "demeaning and
depreciating,, 284 Moenssens cites the following examples:
a. He quotes us as saying, "'Like folk medicine, handwriting
identification may sometimes be efficacious but no verification yet
exists of when, if ever, it is and when it is not.'- 2 85 We did say that. In
fact, we asserted that folk medicine was the best analogy for thinking
about handwriting expertise given the state of the empirical record.
We still think that. It is not "demeaning or depreciating," merely accurate.
281

Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 747 n.72 (citingJOUGHIN & MORGAN,

THE LEGACY OF SACCO & VANZETrT 15-16 (1976)).
282 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE/OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SPECIAL REPORT,
THE FBI LABORATORY: AN INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED
MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSivES-RELATED AND OTHER CASES (1997).
283

Consider the following:

[E]ven where crime laboratories do employ qualified scientists, these
individuals may be so imbued with a pro-police bias that they are willing to circumvent true scientific investigation methods for the sake of
"making their points".
Unfortunately, this attitude is even more
prevalent among some "technicians" (non-scientists) in the crime
laboratories, for whom the presumption of innocence disappears as
soon as police investigative methods focus on a likely suspect.
Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 115, at 6.
And further,
The temptation to fabricate or to exaggerate certainly exists. All experts are tempted, many times during their careers, to report positive
results when their inquiries come up inconclusive, or indeed to report
a negative result as positive when all other investigative leads seem to
point to the same individual. Experts can feel secure in the belief that
their indiscretions will probably never come to light.
Id. at 17. What would Moenssens have said about us if we had written these things?
Contrast these positions taken by Moenssens in 1993 with his assertions in PostDaubert World that prosecution experts in general, and Osbornian handwriting experts in particular, always undertake comparisons either from a "result-neutral" position, or from an assumption "the opposite of what they are asked to determine."
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 322-23 nn.311, 312 and accompanying text. Also note his criticism of Denbeaux for testifying in terms that reflected,
essentially, Moenssens' own 1993 position. See id. at 322. We believe that Moenssens' 1993 position in fact gave the more accurate picture of practical reality.
284
See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 302.
285 Id. at 302 n.228 (quoting Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 734).
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b. Moenssens further states "[i]n concluding, erroneously,
that document examiners were correct 57% of the time and incorrect
43% of the time, the article states: 'This capriciousness contrasts with
claims by document examiners that their field is just shy of perfect.' '2 86 First, our conclusion was not erroneous, given the aggregation formula we used, which was fully explained in the text. The fact
that there are potentially other ways to aggregate the data from five
disparate tests does not render our conclusions "erroneous," and we
still think ours was the best way to approach the data. Second, there
is plenty of evidence that the position advanced by Osbornians for
public consumption has been that the accuracy of handwriting identification, as they practice it, borders on perfect. In Exorcism, we cited
Irby Todd advancing the above position.8 7 In Science and Nonscience
we cited the statement of FBI Document Section Chief Ronald
Furgerson that all "180" "certified" document examiners in the
United States would reach the same conclusions in any given case as
he would, and we cited the trial testimony of FBI document examiner
Richard Williams in United States v. Smyth, making a similar claim.8
The available hard data refute those wishful claims, and that no
doubt is one reason why Moenssens and the QDE community find
these data so objectionable.
c. As another example of our being "demeaning. and depreciating" Moenssens quotes us as saying, "'Listening to the evidence or
reading the reports of experts, we often feel as if we were attending
one of Mr. Home's seances. We are told that others see and we
ought to see what we cannot see.'"289 But we did not say this. This is a
quotation from an 1871 letter to the London Times attributed to A.
Hayward, Esq., Q.C., reviewing Charles Chabot's book The Handwriting of Junius Professionally Investigated, clearly identified as such by
us.20 This quotation was in the "history" section of the article.

286
287

Id. (quoting Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 748 n.73).
See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 738 n.28 (citing Irby Todd, Do Ex-

perts FrequentlyDisagree, 18J. FORENSIC Sci. 455, 458-59 (1973) (stating "it appears safe
to answer a categorical 'No"' to the question of whether document examiners frequently disagree)).
288 Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 41
n.100, 62 n.153
(citing DAVID FISHER, HARD EVIDENCE 196 (1995) and United States v. Smyth, 863 F.
Sup. 1137 (N.D. Cal. 1994)).
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 302 n.228 (quoting Risinger et
al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 760).
M
See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 759.
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d. Finally, the fundamentally accurate and not disrespectful
nature of our observation that Osborn's "mastery of penmanship offered a path off the farm" has been dealt with, supra, at note 159.
25. In documenting his assertion that Exorcism was "full of non
sequiturs" Moenssens cites the following:
a. A non sequitur is "[c]ommenting thatjudges accord little
weight to handwriting expert testimony because they always testify 'in
favor of the party who called them,' even though witnesses 'of equal
honesty, intelligence and experience' testified opposite to the experts. 29' Once again, Moenssens has attributed to us the words of
somebody else. We have never said judges, in general, accord little
weight to handwriting expert testimony. The point referred to by
Moenssens (with the wrong page reference), and the quoted passages, are from the New York Court of Appeals decision in Hoag v.
Wright. 2 The Hoagcourt was one of a number of courts quoted by us
to illustrate "[t]he skepticism of some late 19th and early 20th century courts,"2 s a point for which the quoted language is certainly a

proper illustration. We do not think it's a non sequitur either, but
that is between Moenssens and the judges who decided Hoag. 4
b. A non sequitur is describing "Osborn's departure from the
farm to attend the Rochester Business Institute, his becoming a
teacher of penmanship who realized he was 'in a dying profession'
and decided to go into the handwriting expert business.". We have
already voiced our puzzlement at Moenssens' notion of non sequitur,
but we must note that, once again, he has his summary wrong. Osborn left his father's farm to join the faculty at the Rochester Busi"91Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 302 n.229 (citing Risinger et
al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 764).
29
66 N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1903).
Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 762.
This habit of attributing authorship to us of things we are merely quoting is
irritating. We are beginning to suspect that Professor Moenssens relied too much
on secondary sources, such as lists of complaints by others less academically experienced, rather than actually writing or checking these parts of the article himself. We
have in mind the 1990 "four-page single-spaced list" by Charles C. Scott (which we

have never seen), cataloguing, "serious errors and omission in legal citations" referred to by Moenssens in note 233, and "[c]ritiques of Exorcism" which were "shared
within the questioned document examiners' professional gatherings and at their
'chest-beating' sessions." Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 302 n.225.
We suspect that Moenssens relied on the above, together with the input from the
"many forensic document examiners," some named and some not, who are credited
with "unearthing information," and Peter V. Tytell, who furnished "unpublished materials." See id. at 251 n.**.
295 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1,
at 302 n.229 (citing Risinger et
al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 765).
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ness Institute, not to attend it. And as to the "dying profession" of
penmanship, as we point out in Exorcism, even a person of less intelligence than Osborn would have figured this out pretty quickly after
the introduction of the typewriter.29 Training penman copyists in
1873 was like training typewriter repairmen in 1986: there was not
going to be much of a future in it.
c. Another asserted non sequitur in Exorcism was drawn from
an article published eight years after Exorcism (a nice trick in itself).
Moenssens writes, "In Science and Nonscience... Risinger refers to Osborn's 1910 book, Questioned Documents, and suggests that its success
was due to Osborn's friendship with evidence law giant John Henry
Wigmore and the glowing review the book received by another legal
97 There is no assertion in Science and Nongiant, Roscoe Pound ....,
science that the success of Osborn's book was due to "friendship," and
we don't really know how close Osborn and Wigmore were socially.
It is clear, however, that Wigmore was a convert to Osborn's ideas,
that he wrote an introduction to the book, and that he promoted it.
It is hardly a non sequitur to suggest that Wigmore's support and the
positive review by Pound contributed significantly to the book's acceptance and success, which is all that we suggested in Science and
Nonscience.
d. Moenssens hauls out the "800 pound gorilla" comment
here, which is dealt with at length supra in notes 152-55 and accompanying text (though it must be here noted that it is unclear how this
comment qualifies as a non sequitur.)
e. Finally, Moenssens says:
Also, in referring to the European origins of handwriting identification, it is remarked that it was from "[t]he same intellectual
climate that gave us phrenology, Lombrosian physiognomy and,
as previously noted, graphology, gave us 'chirography' or handwriting identification as a "science."' The inference the authors
must want the reader to draw is that because Europe spawned
myths and fallacies, that everything that came from Europe must
be of the same ilk.29 8

Now, if that is what we intended, that would be a non sequitur. However, the quoted passage was at the end of a discussion of the late
19th century continental attraction to "extreme rationalism on the
See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 765.
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 302 n.229 (citing Risinger &
Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 26).
298 Id. (quoting Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 758-59) (internal
citations
omitted).
296
27
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fringes of science, where theories were spun out to satisfyingly mystical complexity and experience was expected to conform or be
damned."' ' It was in this context that the quotation given by Moenssens was written. We did not suggest that "Europe" had spawned
these things, but a common mindset on the fringes of 19th century
European science. So much for Moenssens' asserted "non sequiturs."
26. Next, in footnote 231 we encounter one of the most puzzling of Moenssens' positions, which is repeated later on page 307
and in footnote 248. In footnote 231 he says, "The authors of Exorcism proclaim that they did not discuss 'graphology' in their article ....However, they immediately thereafter proceeded to cite, in
the very next note, a graphology book for a quote on the antiquity of
the concept of individuality of handwriting. ',30 Moenssens goes on,
in the same note, to refer to the "egregious". "violation" of our "self
imposed limitation on the discussion of graphologists""' because we
noted in Exorcism the case of Heller v. Murray,30 2 a case where a handwriting identification expert (who happened to be a graphologist,
and incidentally a psychologist also, but both facts were irrelevant to
the point for which we cited the case) refused to take a test during
cross-examination that the judge had ruled appropriate. 30 ' Then on
page 307, Moenssens says, "Science and Nonscience also continues the
practice of on one hand, claiming to avoid dealing with or passing
judgment on graphology, and on the other hand relying on statements by its practitioners to prove some point in Risinger and coauthors' criticism of handwriting identification. ' ° Finally, Moenssens illustrates this in footnote 248 by pointing to our citation to
Huntington Hartford for a quotation from Aristotle, our reference to
Camillo Baldi's 1625 treatise (which we identified as of a "definite
graphological cast") as the earliest modern European work asserting
individuality of handwriting, our discussion of the animosity between
"orthodox Osbornians" and graphologically influenced identification
experts, our reference to a work by Robert Saudek for the proposi"i Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 759 (footnotes omitted).
Sm Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 303 n.231 (citing Risinger et
al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 733 n.13 & 734 n.14).
301 Id.
302

447 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981). Moenssens also gleefully points out that

Heller is "incorrectly cited." He fails to indicate that this "incorrect citation" is because the volume number of the secondary citation is given in Exorcism as 442
N.Y.S.2d instead of 447 N.Y.S.2d. Nostra culpa. We might here point out that
Moenssens cited an article, Mark Davis, Weird Science, J. MARSHALL L. REV. 22 (1997),
which is nonexistent. See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 264 n.41.
s03See Heller, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 350-51.
W4 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note
1, at 307 (footnotes omitted).
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tion that graphologists believe their approach aids identification of
handwriting," 5 and our notation of the irony that only the graphologists had attempted anything that looked like empirical studies, however flawed.
First, what we said in Exorcism when we "proclaimed" we were
not going to discuss graphology was, "Note that this article does not
deal with 'graphology,' the assertion that character traits can be divined from the analysis of handwriting. 0 06 And we never do discuss
graphology, so defined, after the footnote in which the quoted
statement appears, nor do we look at any data or cases involving graphology, so defined, in either Exorcism or Science and Nonscience. We
never promised not to use books by graphologists as sources of accurate reference to independent facts, such as our citation to Huntington Hartford's (accurate) reference to Aristotle's assertion that
"U]ust as all men do not have the same speech sounds, neither do
they all have the same writing, 0 07 (which is the quotation Moenssens
complains about),308 or our (accurate) citation to Baldi's treatise as
being the earliest modern European book on the individuality of
handwriting, or our citation to Saudek to show that graphologists
think they can perform identification functions; nor did we promise
not to examine any data or cases or claims dealing with handwriting
identification expert testimony, such as Heller,°n which coincidentally
happened to involve asserted experts who were graphologists.1 We
looked at asserted handwriting identification expertise globally, from
whatever source derived. Yet Moenssens seems outraged that asserted identification expertise by graphologists was not excluded as
an a priori postulate, and repeatedly accuses us of some mysterious
inconsistency, or worse, for not having excluded it. Perhaps the real
motive for these attacks is to be found in the last part of footnote 248,
where Moenssens writes:
The "Osbornians" among the questioned document examiners,
under attack for what they perceive to be unjust and unfair criti-
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It is interesting to note that RobertJ. Muehlberger, credited by Moenssens for

his help on Post-Daubert World, gave more credit to Saudek, rightly or wrongly, in his
testimony in United States v. Martin, than we ever did, saying that Osborn based his
work on that of Saudek. See Martin Transcript, supra note 16, at 128-29.
Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 733 n.13 (emphasis added).
307 Id. at 734
n.14.
SOSWe did establish the accuracy of Hartford's quote from Aristotle in Science and
Nonscience, supra note 2, at 22 n.6. See also HUNTINGTON HARTFORD, YOU ARE

WHAT

You WRITE 43 (1973) (quoting ARiSTOTLE, ON INTERPRETATION, Pt. 1).
sW 447 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981).
310 See Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 307 n.248 & 303 n.231.
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cism of their profession since the 1989 Exorcism article, have
mounted a counter-attack against Risinger and his coauthors 1 after the professors left the lofty spires of academe to descend into
the pit of courtroom battle. Having become litigation antagonists, testifig as expert witnesses on the non-scientific nature of
handwriting identification testimony for the defense in criminal
cases against state or federal crime lab experts who take a differing view, it is only natural for Risinger and his coauthors to use
any means to buttress the positions they take in litigation and direct their own ire at the "orthodox Osbornians" while giving
312
credit to the graphoanalysts .
Note that the above quotation is inconsistent with Moenssens'
oft-repeated attack concerning our "apparent ignorance of the dif31 3
ferences in training, education and professional orientation"
among different schools of asserted handwriting identification expertise, and his claim that we are "peculiarly unaware that a sizable
number of graphologists have indeed invaded the ranks of
'handwriting experts' and have assumed the designation 'questioned
document examiner'.. . . , Thus, one moment he criticizes us for
being unaware of the competing schools, and the next moment he
criticizes us for siding with one school against the other. However,
we have never "buttressed" any positions we have taken by giving any
affirmative credit to graphologists, unless you count the indisputable
irony noted regarding empirical research
Finally, if we have directed any ire anywhere, it has been at judges and the legal system for
not living up to their claimed ideology of accuracy maximization, not
at any particular group of asserted experts.
27. Continuing on the "graphology" theme, Moenssens asserts in
footnote 231 that we "credited the graphoanalysts' claims to competence in handwriting identification as equal to those of the Nashville
participants by including their performances in the calculation of socalled 'error rates.', 3 ' The reference to the Nashville participants is
a little obscure, but apparently refers to the members of the Ques311

Inaccurate as it is, we believe Moenssens' article is that counterattack. See su-

pra note 294.
,. Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note
1, at 307 n.248.
313 Id. at 303 n.231.
314 Id.
315 See discussion in Part I, supra text accompanying
notes 56-58. We have never
said that the attempts of graphologists at empirical research were of high quality.
Their research, like Inbau's early study, was severely flawed. We have merely said
that, in both instances, credit was due for at least trying, however flawed the attempt.
See Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience, supra note 2, at 71 n.210.
316 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 303 n.231.
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tioned Document Section of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences at the 1996 annual meeting, at which we had been invited to
speak.3 7 We never "included" any graphoanalysts' performances in
anything. We took no steps to "exclude" such performances from the
data, because there was no way to determine specifically if there were
any such people in the FSF studies. However, as we have noted elsewhere, since the FSF participants were all from government labs, and
since these labs are all "orthodox Osbornian" in their stated orientation, the data seem to be derived exclusively or nearly exclusively
31
from the ranks of orthodox Osbornians.
28. On page 304, Moenssens makes the following claim:
What was certainly inexcusable in Exorcism was the authors' serious deficiency in legal research, in the use of inaccurate, inappropriate, out-of-date citations, and in citing authorities for
propositions which they do not support. Law professors have research assistants and law review editors to prevent this from happening. Yet Exorcism contained innumerable errors in its citations
of legal authorities, statutes, and other materials. 1 9
In the same vein, in footnote 233, where Moenssens claims to
document the above charges, we find the following three prefatory
assertions to the three paragraphs in that footnote: "To list here all
the inaccuracies in case citation and statutes is unnecessary, but to
give the reader a clue, 3
to give just a few representative errors
among many, 32 ' and "[a] [c]avalier manner of using and misusing
citations pervades the article. '3
Here we have the epicenter of
Moenssens' McCarthyite criticism. He claims "innumerable" errors'23
(we bet we could count them), and that any examples he gives are
only a small sample of all the ones he secretly knows about. How are
we to respond to such claims? Well, let's look at the claimed errors
he does list, remembering that he is extremely unlikely to have selected examples that are atypically trivial. Indeed, the reader would
be justified in inferring that these are the most egregious examples
he has, if he in fact has any more at all. 24
317

24.

The 1996 annual meeting of the AAFS took place in Nashville, Tenn., Feb. 19-

320

See note 57 supra.
Moenssens, Post-DaubertWorld, supra note 1, at 304 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 304 n.233.

321

Id.

318
319

322 Id.

See id. at 304.
asserts that the "errors" he lists are "representative." See id. at 304
n.233. However, is it really believable that he would have passed up reporting a truly
323

324 Moenssens
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a. Example 1:
[M]ost of the statutes in Appendix 3 were inaccurate, outdated,
or inapplicable. For some states, the authors cite what they say
are the current statutes or rules, thus implying that none of the
other states have current statutes or rules authorizing comparison
of handwriting by experts, which is not true. As a matter of fact,
most of the other states have current statutes or rules which
should have been cited. Each instance of a failure to cite a statute
or rule is an error of omission. 5
This is truly bizarre. Appendix 3 in Exorcism is clearly marked
"Date of Formal Acceptance of Handwriting Expert Testimony by
Each State (in chronological order) ,"32

and contains three columns

of entry: state, date, and instrument of acceptance [statute, decision,
court rule, etc.].327 Since most states accepted such expertise before
World War I, the cited statutes or rules (and cases) inevitably are
"outdated," for goodness sake. It is true that we listed a current version of statutory or rule authority where we discovered one in those
jurisdictionswhere the originalauthority was statutory or by rule, but as with
case law, no implication that other jurisdictions did not have more
recent authority, statutory or otherwise, was stated or intended. Indeed, in the text itself, we noted that by the end of the 19th century
such testimony had gained general acceptance, and that by the time
the article was written every state accepted expert testimony on
handwriting analysis.328 We further noted that even in those few
states where we had discovered no formal authority, at the trial level
after [the
"handwriting expertise was probably accepted in3 practice
9
Lindbergh Kidnapping case,] State v. Hauptmann.
b. Example 2. Moenssens states that in Exorcism "it is stated
that 'in Wyoming there is still no formal authority' admitting handwriting expert testimony .... In fact, Wyoming adopted the Uniform
Rules of Evidence in 1978 and Rule 906(b) (s) [sic] thereof specifically authorized comparisons by experts. What's more, Wyoming
case law on handwriting expert testimony goes back to 1932. '' 30o This
is really two points. First, there is no URE 906(b) (s), or Wyoming
egregious error simply to maintain the typicality of his asserted sample?
325 Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supranote 1, at 304 n.233.
327 Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 788 app. 3.
528 See id. (emphasis added).
329 See Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 761-62.
115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (1935).
Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 304 n.233 (citing Risinger et
al., Exorcism, supa note 2, at 761 and State Bd. of Law Exam'rs. v. Strahan, 8 P.2d
30

1090 (Wyo. 1932)).
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Rule of Evidence 906 anything. 2 ' URE 901 (b) (3), like the parallel
Federal Rule and Wyoming Rule, authorizes "comparison by the trier
of fact or by an expert with specimens which have been authenticated" without dealing with the acceptability of any asserted expertise. As such, we did not cite such provisions unless they had been
explicitly applied to handwriting, as in North Dakota and Arkansas. 2
As to State Board of Law Examiners v. Strahan,3 3 we missed it. We
would point out only that this omission was in the context of an appendix dealing with historical sources for every American jurisdiction, and, barring the reading of every case ever reported, older
sources that were not then on any computer data base were easy to
miss on points for which they are neither headnoted nor referenced
in some other authority, such as Wigmore. Both things are true of
in Strahan. For missing it, we offer
the use of a handwriting expert
33 4
the smallest of nostra culpas.
c. Example 3. We stated that Arkansas was still "getting along
nicely" 3 5 without handwriting experts as late as 1925, whereas Moens-

sens points out that "[i]n fact, Arkansas case law on handwriting expert testimony goes back at least to Strickland v. Strickland, 129 S.W.
331
332

See generally UNIF. R. EVID.; WYo. R. EVID.
Moenssens also makes the argument, rejected in United States v. Starzecpyze4

880 F. Supp. 1027, 1040 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), that the language of FED. R. EVID.
901(b) requires the admission of handwriting identification expertise. See Moenssens, supra note 1, at 268 n.55. However, 901(b) (2) refers only to "nonexpert opinion on handwriting" and 901(b) (3) refers globally to "comparison by... expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated." This refers to any asserted
expertise whatever, from fingerprints to earmarks, and it does not in any way prejudge the admissibility of any asserted form of expertise, novel or not.
8 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1932).
3M It is also true that Strahan is not really authority for the admissibility of handwriting identification expertise in the sense we meant in Appendix 3, since the issue
of admissibility was not dealt with in the case. Rather, the case merely notes without
comment that such evidence had been admitted at trial (apparently without objection) and was part of the record. See Strahan,8 P.2d at 1091. Thus, it is evidence of
the admission of such evidence without dealing with its admissibility. It is generally
true that any asserted form of evidence will have to have been admitted, perhaps repeatedly, at the trial level before its admissibility is authoritatively dealt with and determined in a jurisdiction. An early case fitting this pattern, for instance, is one
cited by Moenssens, Bank of Muskingum v. Carpenter'sAdm'rs, 7 Ohio 21, 31-32 (1835),
where testimony by an expert is noted in the summary of evidence but not adverted
to in the opinion. United States v. Samperyac, 27 F. Cas. 932, 940-41 (C.C.Ark. 1831)
(No. 16,216a), also noted by Moenssens, does not fit this pattern, since the witnesses
in that case appear to have been lay witnesses treated as sufficiently familiar with the
genuine handwriting of the putative signatories to give an opinion. In any case,
Moody v. Rowell, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 490 (1835), remains the earliest known American case considering the admissibility of handwriting identification expertise, as
noted in Exorcsm.
335 See Risinger et al, Exorcism, supra note 2, at 761 n.136.
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801 (Ark. 1910), and in 1920, the worth of handwriting expert testimony was acknowledged by the court in Murphy v. Murphy, 222 S.W.
721 (Ark. 1920).""' We did miss both cases. The Strickland case, like
Strahan,was neither headnoted on the handwriting expert point, nor
referenced elsewhere that we discovered, and like Strahan, did not
really deal with the admissibility of such expertise. Half a nostra culpa
on that. The Murphy case, however, was headnoted, and we concede
we should have found that case and included it in the Appendix. A
full nostra culpa on that.
d. In support of his assertion that a "[ciavalier manner of using and misusing citations pervades 337 Exorcism, Moenssens says,
For example, at the end of their discussion of the attitude of the
judiciary toward document examination... the authors selected a
particularly snide quotation from In re Estate of Sylvestris but fail to
reveal in their footnotes that the quotation is not from the decision, but from the dissenting opinion.3 9
In fact Exorcism says as follows:
The current status [of handwriting identification expertise] can
best be illustrated by the following quote from In re Estate of Sylvestri,
a New York decision in sharp contrast to the thundered skepticism of Hoag v. Wright "Since that rather cynical observation was
made by our highest court in Hoag, examiners of questioned
documents, as handwriting experts prefer to be called,
have at" 34
tained more respectable standing in the courtroom. 0
This quote is not snide, it states the facts concerning the respectable
standing of document examiners by the time of its writing in 1977,
and that is the only point for which it was used in the article. However, it is true that the quotation is from a dissent (which was the only
opinion filed in the matter). While not particularly relevant to the
use for which the quotation was given, this fact should have been
noted, and the source of the quote should not have been referred to
as a "decision." So a nostra culpa for that one also, though it hardly
shows us abusing citations to give a false picture of judicial attitudes
toward handwriting identification expertise.

3M

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 304 n.233.
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Id.

390 N.Y.S.2d 598 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 304 n.233 (citing Risinger et
al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 771).
340 Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 2, at 771 (quoting
Sylvestri, 390 N.Y.S.2d at
600 (Cohalan, PJ., dissenting) and citing Hoag v. Wright, 66 N.E. 579, 581 (N.Y.
1903)).
3

339 Moenssens,
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And there you have it. These are the examples which show our
"serious deficiency in legal research, in the use of inaccurate, inappropriate, out-of-date citations, and in citing authorities for propositions which they do not support."3 41 Most of our claimed delicts came
from Appendix 3, which was not central to the Article. We missed
two cases in the appendix that anyone might miss, and we missed another appendix case that we fairly ought to have found. In addition,
in the main text we failed to note that one quotation was from a dissent when that was of no particular importance to the use to which
we put it. We do beg the pardon of the academic community, but we
have this to say: We have yet to write (or read) a formally perfect article,3 42 and have little hope of ever doing so. Yet, given the number
of document examiners and prosecutors who have combed this article for ten years looking for any error at all, and given that this was
the worst they could find, we are reasonably well content.

341
342

Moenssens, Post-Daubert World, supra note 1, at 304.
Need we point out that this includes Post-Daubert World?.

